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Introduction 
Some of the best views in Kigali are from the balconies of the Rwandan 
parliamentary building, which is perched atop one of the highest hills in a city full of slopes 
and summits. Elevated above the motorcycles, street vendors, and bustling crowds, it is a 
rare pocket of stillness in Kigali’s ubiquitous commotion. On a hot, November afternoon, 
I stand on a balcony here and watch the city vibrate beneath me. Construction cranes dot 
the landscape, policemen keep hordes of vehicles moving along well-kempt roads, and 
billboards advertise a national talent competition held in Amahoro stadium. “Amahoro” 
is the Kinyarwanda word for peace. 
 Yet, when I look directly over the edge of the balcony I see that my fingers have 
been resting on a wall pock-marked by shrapnel explosions from the 1994 genocide. In the 
distance Amahoro stadium is painted vibrantly in the colors of the Rwandan flag, but fresh 
paint does not trick people into forgetting its former life as the UN’s meager genocide-
response headquarters. The airport’s runway, perhaps the flattest terrain in view, will 
always be known as the site above which a president’s plane was shot down and a genocide 
was subsequently unleashed. The horrors of that period are inextricably etched in 
Rwanda’s landscape. They are also etched into the essence of every Rwandan. 
In April of 1994, about 800,000 Tutsis and their loyal allies were slaughtered by 
200,000 of their Hutu neighbors, relatives, and friends in the swiftest genocide of the 
century.1 Seventy-five percent of the population lost a close relative. After one-hundred 
days of terror, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a well-organized rebel force of Tutsi 
refugees, ended the slaughter and took control. With the victory of the RPF, two million 
                                                 
1  "Genocide in Rwanda." United Human Rights Council. 
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.html.  
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Hutus fled in fear of ethnic revenge on the part of the new government.2 This fear has 
slowly begun to dissipate, but interethnic mistrust lingers. Between 250,000 and 500,000 
women had been raped during the genocide, 67% of whom had been infected with HIV, 
and 75,000 children were orphaned.3 Twenty-two years later, the largest armed group in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a band of stalwart genocide perpetrators still 
seeking revenge against the RPF and stoking ethnic tensions. This is a snapshot of the 
population that the Rwandan government, still controlled by the RPF, has been attempting 
to weave into a nation with a single identity for the past twenty-two years. 
The parliamentarian I met with that day on the balcony, Edouard, laid out the 
complexity of creating a unified, non-ethnic identity in post-genocide Rwanda as he 
discussed the challenges that will come with raising his future children. He is a Hutu 
married to a Tutsi, an atypical union he says has only happened about ten-thousand times 
since the genocide.  
“My children are going to be half-Rwandan and half-confused because their 
parents are mixed. I hope their children are three-quarters Rwandan and one-
quarter confused, and maybe in three generations we will only be Rwandans.” 
 
Like the Rwandan landscape, fresh Rwandan faces cannot mask the haunting effects of 
the genocide. Even in three generations, the genocide will likely still be engrained in the 
people.  
The RPF government is publicly engaging in the politics of identity as it 
simultaneously tries to expunge old, ethnic identities and construct a new, national one.  
At its crux, identity politics happen when actors define an in-group and use that cohesion 
to gain power or benefits over another group or groups. In the case of ethnic identity 
                                                 
2  "Rwanda, Genocide, Hutu, Tutsi, Mass Execution, Ethnic Cleansing, Massacre, Human 
Rights, Victim Remembrance, Education, Africa." UN News Center. 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml.  
3  "Statistics: Rwandan Genocide." Survivors Fund. http://survivors-
fund.org.uk/resources/rwandan-history/statistics/  
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politics, it is an attempt to gain power at the expense of an out-group of a different 
ethnicity.4 Though the RPF publicizes itself as a government for all Rwandans and strongly 
denies that it is engaging in ethnic politics, its party’s interests frequently align with Tutsi 
interests. It’s genesis as a Tutsi rebel force and its policies that seem to favor this group 
lead many to see it as an arm of Tutsi power first and foremost, and then secondly as the 
Rwandan government. Under the RPF, national unification and inclusive identity 
formation will only happen if they feel that the Tutsi and the party itself are one-hundred 
percent protected.   
Edouard heads the youth branch of the RPF’s national identity initiative, 
epitomized by its motto, “Ndi umunyarwanda,” “I am Rwandan.” Like other leaders of 
the government, he concurs that most people directly affected by the genocide cannot 
completely disengage from ethnic identification or animosity, but he invests idealism and 
optimism for the country in younger generations. The government aims to prevent as 
much genocidal trickle-down as possible from seeping into younger generations in order 
to protect the population from future ethnic violence. Edouard, and others like him, hope 
that if they are proactive in re-educating the children, maybe in three generations, with 
his great-grandchildren, the phrase “I am Rwandan” will replace “I am Hutu” or “I am 
Tutsi.” The RPF hopes they can stifle ethnicity and opposition until this education is 
complete.   
The origins, evolution, and politics of Rwandan identities have been manipulated 
over centuries in a variety of ways and for a variety of purposes. In Rwanda, Hutu, Tutsi, 
and Twa groups are not clearly defined ethnicities, they better resemble cultural groups, 
but because the literature widely describes them as ethnic, this paper will do so as well. 
                                                 
4 Mary Bernstein and Verta Taylor. "Identity Politics." The Wiley-Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, September 14, 2013. 
doi:10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm104.  
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Historically, Tutsis have made up approximately 14% of the population, Hutus about 85%, 
and Twas comprise the remaining 1%.5 Since independence, Rwanda has developed a 
cyclical pattern of power reversals as Hutus and Tutsis have alternately enjoyed authority, 
typically at the expense of the other. Part of this cycle has been using periods of ethnic 
victimhood to justify seizing political rule and enacting vengeful policies against the other 
group. While intragroup unity has remained a strong component of individuals’ identities, 
an intergroup sense of unified “Rwandaness” has never taken root, largely due to feelings 
of victimization at the hands of the other. These interethnic roots are what the government 
is publicly trying to implant in future generations.  
Unfortunately, the RPF’s quest to create this new identity is fraught with 
contradictions and paradoxes that perpetuate issues of ethnic divisionism. To create a 
unified identity, the government completely dominates the way Rwanda’s history is told, 
all public discourse around ethnicity, and the language people can use to discuss their 
identities. Its critics are violently suppressed and fear is one of the main tools that the RPF 
uses to induce cooperation from the population. The ethnic implications of the RPF’s 
political strategy have not yet had time to completely unfurl, but inklings of its 
ramifications are coming to light as the first generation born after the genocide emerges 
into adulthood. It appears that fear is a more pervasive consequence than a total Rwandan 
identity transformation.  
While identity is an ever-evolving concept, this moment in the story of Rwandan 
identity is unique. It is dynamic. The government’s strict interpretation of Rwandan 
history and national identity frequently run counter to family histories and messages 
about ethnicity that Rwandans receive at home. The RPF is not widely seen as the inclusive 
party working to unify people that it tries to portray domestically, there is substantial 
                                                 
5 "Rwanda, Genocide, Hutu, Tutsi…” 
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political suppression and fear that Rwandans associate with it. Without a safe space to 
explore the vital disparities surrounding their Rwandan identities and cultural 
backgrounds, a generation is being brought up mired in dissonance. The government’s 
biggest shortcoming is the belief that if they wait long enough, stick to their black and 
white interpretation of the genocide, and force people to adopt their agenda, violent 
antagonisms of the past can be buried in the ground with the older generations. They fail 
to realize the intergenerational effects of the genocide, the reminders of ethnicity that 
cannot be silenced, and the contradictions they are actively creating by continuing a 
political discourse of victimhood. It is unclear whether they will be successful in redefining 
Rwandaness, but it will take more than time, a new history curriculum, and a strong arm.   
 
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Chapter 1: Cycles of Victimhood 

 
Since Rwandan independence in 1962, identifying as the victim of ethnic 
aggression has been a prevailing political strategy amongst Hutu and Tutsi leaders. The 
Hutu revolutionaries, who first used the strategy in 1959, discovered that it was an easy 
way to mobilize oppressed masses, quiet foreign critics, and get away with policies that 
were blatantly discriminatory or hostile. Through the genocide Hutu leaders preached that 
unless a hard stance was adopted against the Tutsi, Hutus would all be forced back into 
the subservience they had historically suffered at the hands of Tutsis and colonizers alike. 
Subsequently, a growing body of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda was accumulating outside 
of the country and compiling their own chronicle of victimization at the hands of these 
radical Hutu politicians. After Hutu fear-mongering escalated to the genocide, Tutsis were 
clearly the new victims of ethnic aggression and the RPF leaders took their turn 
capitalizing on the political benefits of victimhood.  
Today the RPF claims to be eradicating ethnic divisions in the population, which 
have always existed within of an unequal power paradigm, but still plays the victim card 
when it is politically beneficial. In a May 2011 speech, Paul Kagame took this approach,  
"I don't think anybody out there in the media, UN, human rights organizations, 
has any moral right whatsoever to level any accusations against me or against 
Rwanda. Because, when it came to the problems facing Rwanda, and the Congo, 
they were all useless."6 
 
The contradictory stance of posing as a victimized group, while in the midst of trying to 
erase the divisions that created this reality, has created a confusing narrative of identity. 
Rwandans do not feel that they are able to acknowledge obvious ethnic tensions, but they 
live under a government legitimizing itself with the possibility for potential future ethnic 
                                                 
6William Wallis. "Lunch with Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda." Slate. May 15, 2011. 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/ft/2011/05/lunch_with_paul_kagame.html.  
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conflicts. The RPF uses Tutsi victimhood to keep itself in power as it dictates a new agenda 
for Rwanda’s history and struggles with identity. To understand the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front and the country today, it is important to understand how Rwanda developed a 
political culture of using the identity of “victim” as capital.  

Empowered Victims 
World War Two indirectly transformed the course of Rwandan history by flipping 
the balance of power in favor of the Hutu majority for the first time. Much of the change 
was spurred by a new European sensitivity toward oppressed populations, at this time the 
Hutu. This sensitivity rose simultaneously with a new, global cash economy, also spurred 
by the war. Established cultural and economic norms in Rwanda, such as patronage 
systems favoring the Tutsi, unraveled and much more individualistic systems took root. 
These changes afforded Hutus fresh social and financial opportunities that had never 
existed. While Belgian disruption of pre-colonial Rwandan society had initially been 
crushing for Hutus, after World War Two they saw various ways around subjugation and 
embraced them, with the eventual result being a revolution.7 Frustrated with colonial 
oppression, Hutus readily capitalized on anything that changed their conditions.  
The Hutu population took to new economic endeavors and opportunities much 
more quickly than many of their Tutsi counterparts who floated on Belgian salaries or 
favor. Tens of thousands of Hutus left Rwanda for the neighboring states of Zaire and 
Uganda to work for cash.8 Hutu emigrations started in 1924 after the Belgians’ loathed 
introduction of compulsory labor and they escalated rapidly as gainful employment 
                                                 
7 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), 42.  
8 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 108. 
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opportunities began to spring up.9 The Hutu who left Rwanda were employed by European 
contractors on plantations or mining operations. At home Hutus had been stuck in rigid 
economic systems that indefinitely bound them in unfair contracts with Tutsi chiefs who 
exploited their labor for the benefit of the colonial state. Ubuhake, the historical Rwandan 
patronage system between Tutsi patrons and Hutu clients, was one of the key institutions 
undermined by the cash economy as many Hutus began to seek means of employment 
elsewhere. These newly empowered men would form a counter élite during the first decade 
after World War Two. 
The Hutu counter élite of rose to the surface during the 1950s, speaking out against 
their Belgian colonizers and Tutsi countrymen’s discrimination and prejudice. Some 
Rwandan Hutus who had emigrated received degrees at foreign universities, where they 
read manifestos by contemporary revolutionaries and were exposed to democracy and 
socialism. These men were joined in openly dissenting from the status quo by the handful 
of Hutus that had been able to squeak out of Rwandan universities.10 The other important 
segment of this new counter élite was made up of Hutu graduates from Catholic seminary 
schools. Adding fuel to their fires was the severe underemployment and discrimination in 
the job market that this small group of Hutu men faced upon their graduations.  
During the Second World War the composition of Rwanda’s Catholic, European 
missionaries underwent a sizeable transformation with consequences that decidedly 
favored the Hutu. The Belgian priests coming in were no longer wealthy or traditional. 
They began to come from lower class backgrounds and many were Flemish, a Dutch-
speaking minority group in Belgium that had felt persecuted against by the French-
                                                 
9 Mamdani, 110.  
10 Ibid.., 112.  
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speaking Walloons for centuries.11 These Flemish missionaries were sympathetic to the 
plight of the Hutu and, especially after the Second World War, sensitive to widespread 
language of the Tutsi being a “superior race.”12 These priests empowered educated Hutus 
in their midst to begin the publication of Kinyamateka, a Church periodical that spread 
egalitarian ideas and spoke out for illiterate Hutus who could not.13   
A pivotal moment was the March 1957 publication in Kinyamateka of the “Bahutu 
Manifesto” by nine leaders of the Hutu counter élite, including one who would become the 
first president of independent Rwanda, Grégoire Kayibanda. This set the stage for the next 
four decades of Rwandan identity politics. It called for a double liberation of the “Hutu 
from both the ‘Hamites’ and the ‘Bazungu’ colonization.”14 This referred to the Tutsis and 
the whites. The core of this document is rooted in perceived racial differences between 
Rwandans, showing how ingrained the colonizers’ messages of irreconcilable 
dissimilarities between the groups had become in the population. “The problem is 
basically that of the political monopoly of one race, the Mututsi. In the present 
circumstances, this political monopoly is turned into an economic and social monopoly,” 
the manifesto reads.15 The document expressly played into the politics of victimhood as 
Hutus sought to leverage their plight to rally members of their in-group against the Tutsi.  
Political parties soon formed along ethnic lines within the colonial state as the tide 
of African independence movements reached Rwanda, much to the rising alarm of the 
Belgians who sensed their power slipping. Tutsis, especially their elite accustomed to 
power, refused to watch the Hutu rise up quietly. In June of 1957, Tutsi politicians 
                                                 
11 Robert Mnookin and Alain Verbeke, “Persistent nonviolent conflict with no 
reconciliation: The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium”. Law and Contemporary 
Problems 72 (2009): 151. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40647745. 
12 Mamdani, 113. 
13 Prunier, 45.  
14 Mamdani, 116.  
15 Prunier, 45.  
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produced a document stating that it was “the custom of the country” for the Tutsi to be in 
power, going further to cite the pre-colonial conquest of the Hutu by their Tutsi ancestors 
as justification for the status quo. Two Tutsi political parties formed in response to the 
increasingly ethnically-charged environment of 1957, one militant and one more 
moderate. The lifespans of these parties would be cut short in the future because they were 
overpowered by the politically mobilizing Hutus majority who also organized into a 
number of their own parties.16 These groups were crude political parties in the sense that 
they did not work toward diplomatic change, but poised themselves to fight one another.  
What has been called the Social Revolution took place in Rwanda in 1959 when the 
balance of power was unequivocally shifted in favor of Hutus for the first time by the 
Belgian state itself. That fall, tensions between the various political parties and the ethnic 
groups they represented were physically embodied by the attack of a Hutu political leader 
by Tutsis.17 Around the country Hutus took swift revenge, killing at least 200 Tutsi chiefs 
and sub-chiefs who were working for the colonial state. Belgian administrators rapidly 
made the political decision to support a new Hutu government under their colonial 
authority. Their other option seemed to be assuming the risk of losing total control in a 
long-term conflict against eighty-five percent of the population. Over three hundred Tutsi 
chiefs and sub-chiefs were replaced by the Belgians with Hutus and the old military was 
scrapped, replaced with a representative force of 85% Hutu soldiers and 15% Tutsi 
soldiers.18  A Hutu political party, PARMEHUTU, emerged victoriously in the first national 
elections and enjoyed the support of the Belgians.   
The late 1950s and early 1960s were a terrible time to be a Tutsi in Rwanda, 
especially in the northwest where the Hutus most drastically outnumbered them. Periods 
                                                 
16 Mamdani, 121. 
17 Ibid., 123. 
18 Ibid., 124.  
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of violence, economic discrimination, and even pogroms plagued the Tutsi population, 
while Hutu perpetrators enjoyed virtual impunity from the new Hutu chiefs. Seeing that 
their days in Rwanda were numbered, the Belgians declined to intervene on behalf of the 
suffering Tutsis because they felt that a Hutu alliance could prolong their relationship with 
Rwanda more than a Tutsi alliance could. From a population of 2.7 million Rwandan 
Tutsis, about 130,000 were exiled refugees by 1963.19 The political benefits of perceived 
victimhood had become clear to Hutus, and future leaders in Rwanda would also take note. 

Hutu Power 
On July 1, 1962 Rwanda became independent of the Belgians, who had voluntarily 
left after realizing they could no longer afford to maintain the colony. Grégoire Kayibanda, 
an author of the “Bahutu Manifesto” and member of PARMEHUTU, became president. 
The number of Tutsis in exile was swelling and in December of 1963 they launched a large, 
but poorly organized, attack from Burundi that almost reached Kigali.20 Kayibanda’s 
young government and their supporters swiftly retaliated, murdering over 10,000 Tutsis 
and executing all Tutsis that still held government positions in a matter of weeks. This 
firmly consolidated Hutu control of Rwanda and made it clear that there was not going to 
be ethnic inclusion in government. While the Tutsi were cleaning their wounds, the 
Kayibanda government, later referred to as the First Republic, was recreating an 
archetypically Rwandan, centralized hierarchy. The only difference was that for the first 
time it was not being run by the Tutsi.   
The Kayibanda regime and the Belgians continued a mutually beneficial 
relationship after independence. As opposed to most other parts of Africa, many Hutus 
                                                 
19 Prunier, 52.  
20 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with 
Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998), 64. 
Skutch 16 
viewed their former colonizers as their liberators. In this case it was liberation from 
oppression by the Tutsi.21 This shows the depth of the Belgian’s racialization of Hutu and 
Tutsi identities in Rwanda; Hutus believed the Belgians had freed them from centuries of 
subjugation by a foreign, Tutsi invader. The cruel genius of Belgian colonization was that 
Tutsis were the faces Hutus saw carrying out racist policies, the Belgians could brush their 
culpability off. Because the Tutsi were considered a racially distinct group with a foreign 
origin, as the Belgians had taught Rwandans, they were given no place in Rwandan politics 
or legitimate claim to reside in the country.22   
Unrest continued to escalate within the country throughout the 1960s and early 
1970s as ethnic tensions were catalyzed by a conflict in neighboring Burundi, which has 
the same ethnic makeup. In Burundi, 200,000 Hutus were massacred by a Tutsi-
dominated army.23 In reaction, Rwandan Tutsis were legally barred by Kayibanda’s 
government from essentially all public institutions and a growing number of private ones. 
Broadcasts over state-sponsored Radio Rwanda began to call for a larger, more vengeful 
“solution” to the Tutsi problem. The violence in Burundi was portrayed as the inevitable 
consequence of Tutsi power and Rwandan Hutus were made to feel that they would be 
massacred like their Burundian neighbors had been if it was allowed.  
Meanwhile, most Hutus felt that not enough economic progress had been made 
under Kayibanda’s government- the majority of them were still destitute and uneducated 
despite the political climate being in their favor. As frustration grew, a major in the army, 
Juvenal Habyarimana, attracted a following of disappointed Hutus with his promises of 
national development. Habyarimana easily overthrew Kayibanda in 1973 with a bloodless 
coup, establishing his presidency and what would be known as the Second Republic.24 
                                                 
21 Gourevitch, 59.  
22 Mamdani, 134. 
23 Ibid., 137. 
24 Prunier, 61.  
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After the unmitigated discrimination of Kayibanda’s regime, the Second Republic seemed 
a bit less harsh to the Tutsi. They were brought back into the realm of being “Rwandan,” 
no longer referred to as a race of foreign invaders, but as an ethnic minority that had once 
possessed too much unfair privilege and needed to be regulated. Racial discrimination was 
turned into ethnic discrimination as they were re-included as legitimate members of the 
nation, but subjected to severe restrictions. Rigid quota systems were put in place in every 
public sphere, Tutsis could constitute no more than 15% of any sector, but often made up 
far less than this proportion.25 These quotas also applied to public universities, the only 
universities in the country. By recognizing the Tutsi as a legitimate minority, the Second 
Republic was able to keep critics outside the country from protesting and create seemingly 
legitimate parameters for their minimal inclusion.   
While Habyarimana’s policies seemed somewhat moderate to outsiders, they 
infuriated many Hutus who did not believe that they went far enough in protecting them. 
On the other hand, his policies simultaneously enraged Tutsis who thought they were 
egregious. There were a slew of coup attempts by Hutus who thought Habyarimana was 
“pro-Tutsi” for his policies and, at the same time, a host of Tutsi voices making the reverse 
argument from outside of the country.26 Political pressure mounted against the president 
to allow formal organization of opposing political parties, banned after his coup, and in 
1991 he felt forced to allow their introduction. The parties that emerged within the country 
represented diverse Hutu opinions on the issue of ethnic inclusion of Tutsis, but the only 
formal Tutsi organizations rested outside of Rwanda.27  
Habyarimana was paralyzed between the loud demands of the Tutsi diaspora to be 
readmitted into Rwanda under satisfactory conditions and the absolute refusal of the Hutu 
                                                 
25 Prunier, 75.  
26 Mamdani, 149.  
27 Ibid., 154. 
Skutch 18 
majority within the country to allow this. Since 1959 Tutsis had been emigrating in trickles 
and bursts, and by 1990 there were between 400,000 and 600,000 in exile all over the 
world.28 Most of them were in refugee camps in Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire, where they 
loudly demanded access to and more rights within Rwanda. Facing additional pressure 
from the refugees’ host nations, Habyarimana knew he could not refuse the Tutsis’ re-
admittance forever, but he also knew that if he allowed the Tutsi to return to Rwanda it 
would further infuriate his flagging base of Hutu support. This inescapable issue of Tutsi 
repatriation would lead to a civil war and its escalation to the genocide.  
In reaction to whispers about the growing threat of Tutsi Power from the refugee 
camps of Uganda, Hutu Power movements accelerated and radicalized within Rwanda. 
The leading Hutu Power movement was birthed from the most extreme wing of 
Habyarimana’s own party. 29 They were known as the akazu, “little house,” and were 
interestingly led by Habyarimana’s wife and her brothers outside of the president’s 
control. Habyarimana was too afraid of his party’s radicals and his wife to rein them in; he 
soon became the subject of national derision for his weakness. The Radio Libre des Milles 
Collines (RTML) became one of the most important tools of the Hutu Power movement, 
incessantly broadcasting hate speech to the largely illiterate population of Hutus. They 
told them that they must either join their brothers in the fight against the Tutsi or would 
once again be subjugated and exploited if Tutsis returned from exile to Rwanda. Many 
Hutu fell under the belief that they only had one choice: “to kill or be killed.”30  
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Mamdani, 161.  
29 Ibid., 191.  
30 Ibid., 191. 
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Abatabazi 
Across the border in Uganda, the current government began its life as a Rwandan 
Tutsi rebel force with the mission of bringing their people back to their homeland. The 
government’s reputation as a Tutsi rebel-force-turned-political-party is perhaps one of its 
greatest burdens today. No one in Rwanda forgets that Paul Kagame’s political legitimacy 
and widespread support was originally staked in his position as the leader of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front, or in other words as the savior of the Tutsi. During the genocide the RPF 
referred to itself with the Kinyarwanda word, abatabazi, literally translating to “savior.”31 
This is something that Kagame and his party have simultaneously fought against and 
embraced since 1994, playing the victim and the unifier at different times. Kagame is a 
political entrepreneur with a streak of belligerence, he is decidedly finished with watching 
other people and, especially, other nations make severe blunders with Rwanda’s soul.    
The RPF was born in Ugandan refugee camps where scores of Tutsi youths were 
growing restless, unable to assimilate into local populations and legally barred from 
returning to their homeland by Habyarimana’s government. Kagame was one of the 
restless Tutsi youths who spent the vast majority of his young life in limbo as a refugee in 
Uganda. Uganda was going through great political turmoil during the 1970s and 1980s 
and many young Tutsi men found an outlet for their anger in Ugandan political guerilla 
groups. Kagame joined one headed by Yoweri Museveni and quickly proved himself as an 
invaluable asset. After about fifteen years of fighting, Museveni won power and sent 
Kagame, now a key advisor, to the American military college at Fort Leavenworth.32 With 
his experience in guerilla battle and his American military training, Kagame was finally 
poised to do what he had dreamed of since he was a child- lead tens of thousands of Tutsi 
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fighters back into Rwanda and reclaim their place. So he formed the RPF with other 
refugees and they became a remarkably well-oiled army training in the Ugandan bush.  
In 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front began a civil war with Habyarimana’s 
government because they saw him stalling on the issue of Tutsi repatriation and were 
under intense pressure to leave their refugee camps, but offered no other place to go. The 
RPF additionally feared that escalating Hutu antagonism toward Tutsis within Rwanda, 
emanating from the akazu and RTLM broadcasts, was becoming alarming. After three 
years of guerilla fighting between the RPF and the government, the Arusha Peace Accords 
were introduced by the United Nations in 1993 as an attempt to bring about a ceasefire 
and the safe reintegration of Tutsi refugees, politically and socially.33 Both sides had the 
political incentive to show up to Arusha because they feared being labeled as an aggressor 
while the international community was watching. However, neither the RPF nor 
Habyarimana’s government believed in the process’s efficacy. They remained ready for 
conflict, entering a wary stand-off as they went through the motions of negotiating.  
On April 6, 1994 unknown forces shot down the plane of President Habyarimana, 
who was returning from Arusha after another round of peace talks. The most likely culprits 
were the akazu who were unwilling to accept the direction the peace accords were headed, 
toward a power sharing agreement with the RPF.34 The genocide commenced within hours 
of the plane crash, showing that it had been planned long before the actual violence began. 
The rapidly erected roadblocks, systematic Tutsi home invasions, and dispersal of 
weapons were in no way spontaneous. The world was startled by the violence’s 
bureaucratic nature and horrific efficiency, which sustained a kill rate of about 8,000 
people per day for 100 days. The end of the Tutsi massacres and the civil war, which had 
been ongoing in spurts since 1990, was brought about by the military victory of the RPF 
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who realized the outside world was not going to intervene to aid their Tutsi brothers and 
sisters. Here begins the RPF’s transformation into a political party and their quest to 
redefine Rwandan identity.  
Tackling the reality of serving a primarily Hutu population has been Kagame’s 
government’s largest test, and the reason they chose to call themselves “the Government 
of National Unity and Reconciliation.” Intentionally or not, they sent mixed signals on the 
issue of ethnic inclusion from the outset. Upon the victory of the RPF in 1994, two million 
Hutus fled into neighboring countries out of fear that Kagame and his still-growing rebel 
force would carry out a revenge genocide. Ninety percent of those who fled were innocent, 
but so many innocent Tutsis had been murdered during the genocide that a lack of 
culpability did not secure confidence in anyone.  
A crisis quickly arose that forced the RPF to publicly address an issue infused with 
ethnic implications. Refugee camps in Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire were absolutely 
unequipped to handle the influx of needy Hutu refugees after the genocide. In Western 
Rwanda and the Goma province of Eastern Zaire a massive cholera epidemic broke out in 
internally displaced persons’ settlements and refugee camps on July 20, 1994 because of 
the toxic conditions. It spread like wildfire and in a span of two weeks it was taking the 
lives of 3,000 Hutus per day.35 Some in the international media construed this cholera 
outbreak as a “genocide of the Hutus,” which the displaced Hutu Power leaders quickly 
embraced to gain international sympathy. These former genocidaires tried to portray the 
RPF has intentionally neglecting to help Hutus. The secretary-general of Médecins Sans 
Frontières, Alain Destexhe, who had been working in Rwanda throughout the genocide 
thoroughly rebuked this double-genocide claim saying,  
“This comparison, which one can see widely used in the press, puts on the same 
plane things which have nothing to do with each other. Through this confusion the 
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original, singular and exemplary nature of the genocide is denied and the guilt of 
the perpetrators becomes diluted in the general misery.”36 
 
In a brutal twist of irony, the misinformed media did a better job of covering the 
crisis in the Zairean refugee camps than they did in the previous one-hundred days of Tutsi 
massacres. Since the day the genocide began, not a single American troop set foot in 
Rwanda, but after a week or two of media coverage on the refugee crisis in Zaire there were 
4,000 American troops distributing aid.37 The RPF and Rwandan Tutsis were incensed by 
this. The world had neglected them during the genocide, but scrambled to help the fleeing 
Hutus and the genocidaires in their midst. As the RPF actively fought against the growing 
perception of a double-genocide, their anger was interpreted by Hutus as asking the world 
to let them rot in the camps. Kagame’s overwhelmed new government missed an 
opportunity to publicly show that it was a government for all Rwandans during this crisis, 
but with the genocide still so fresh there was little he could practically have done.    
Kagame understood that making himself the new president right away would be 
too controversial, as he had been the most public figure in the Tutsi rebel army and was 
deeply identified with one side of the ethnic conflict. With this rationale, he made himself 
the Vice President and named a sympathetic Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu, to the presidency 
of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation.38 Many Hutus had opposed the 
genocide, like Bizimingu, and wanting to soothe ethnic tensions, Kagame recruited a 
handful to the new Rwandan government. However, despite these official titles there was 
no doubt that Kagame was running the show and the country.  
Nevertheless, outward ethnic inclusiveness and political savvy would be the trends 
that Kagame tried to set for his new government. They were intended to instill faith in 
Hutus and Tutsis alike that a government could work for both of them, and to turn a new 
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leaf in Rwanda’s history that promoted unification. Even though a Hutu was technically at 
the helm, the new government was considered to be a force of Tutsi Power by most.39 
Because the origins of the RPF are so deeply entrenched in a history of ethnic conflict, it 
actively still struggles to convince Hutus that they being represented and protected.  
The issue of ethnicity rapidly sprang to the surface in a more malicious way as the 
RPF was forced to address the growing problem of revenge killings by its own members. 
This was not an issue that Kagame could reasonably claim was out of his hands, as the 
cholera outbreak had been. The RPF’s ranks had quickly swelled with disenfranchised, 
angry genocide survivors who were swift to lethally retaliate against their Hutu neighbors. 
Up to 6,000 Hutus were murdered in Rwanda during the fall of 1994 by traumatized 
genocide survivors and furious RPF combatants.40 Kagame was adamant that the 
perpetrators of these crimes were being punished in private military tribunals, but it is not 
clear that anything was done. There remain questions about whether the killings were a 
part of the RPF’s agenda or were intentionally ignored by its officials.  
The fear of the RPF organizing massacres against Hutus escalated further in 1995 
when the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF), the new name for the national army, forcibly 
attempted to evacuate an internally displaced persons’ (IDP) camp at Kibeho. The camp 
had been a temporary home for 100,000 IDPs since the genocide, but the government 
designated it as a security risk because it was harboring Hutu perpetrators of the genocide 
and the former government’s combatants.41 In April it was raided by the RDF and 
thousands of Hutu IDPs were murdered in indiscriminate violence; the UN’s initial body 
count was between 6,000 and 8,000.42 The government’s response was only to contest the 
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number of deaths, which they valued at around 300, not to correct their own soldiers’ 
behaviors. A member of the RPF leadership interviewed later on said that these revenge 
killings were “never RPF policy, but there was a certain tolerance.”43 Between the revenge 
killings and the incident at Kibeho, the RPF was creating its own bloody trail. 
Hutus still feared that they might become the victims of a new genocide and, 
understandably, did not take these incidents lightly. They felt that there was not enough 
being done to protect them by a government that was hypothetically working for everyone. 
Two Hutu ministers in the new government became vocal and critical about the scope of 
the ethnic revenge killings and began to collect testimonies about war crimes committed 
by the RPF during and after the civil war.44 They were both quickly removed from their 
posts; one was later assassinated and the other still lives in exile under Rwandan threats. 
Kagame’s evasive attitude when asked about ethnicity and his suppression of critics does 
not instill confidence in Hutus within Rwanda or the refugee camps that they will be safe 
under the administration unless they are one-hundred percent deferential.  
 
These initial conflicts were a true test of how Kagame and his government would 
handle the issue of ethnicity and they had confusing implications, but seemed to 
consistently favor protecting the Tutsi above all else. The true consequence was that the 
RPF ended up defining itself as a fearsome, dominant party with its own vague agenda. 
The policies that the government would soon enact keep ethnic tensions in the country 
palpable, unspoken, and unresolved, The RPF still legitimizes itself through its actions as 
the protectors of its Tutsi brothers and sisters, a nod to the politics of victimhood. 
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Chapter 2: The Evolution of Rwandan Identities 
 
The nature of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa identities is perhaps the most significant and 
simultaneously taboo issue in present-day Rwanda. It is analogous to “stepping on a land 
mine.”45 There is no general agreement about where these identities came from or what 
they initially meant, but all Rwandans recognize their eruption into the 1994 genocide. 
Today, the words “Hutu” and “Tutsi” pack such loaded memories and personal sentiments 
into their staccato syllables that many Rwandans question whether their origins even 
matter anymore. However, the RPF government has insisted the origins of these groups 
prove that Rwandans are historically one people who were wickedly manipulated by 
colonialism. They consider this point to be crucial for post-genocide recovery and security. 
To understand exactly how the RPF is revising the concept of being Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, it 
is critical to look at the most accurate, historical understanding of how these identities 
have evolved over time in comparison to the government’s version.   
 
Pre-Colonial Rwandan Identities 
Rwandan history was passed down orally until Europeans began to record it in the 
mid-nineteenth century. One of the significant problems with oral histories in an 
extremely hierarchical society, like pre-colonial Rwanda’s, is that the person in power 
could unilaterally dictate how the past was recalled.46 The story of Rwanda may have been 
retold and changed any number of times without leaving traces. Any reliable pre-colonial 
history, however, mentions the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa groups living together, sharing a 
common culture and speaking a single, unique language, Kinyarwanda. The stability of 
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these groups leaves vagueness about where the distinctions between them lay or 
originated. Over the past century, this vagueness has become the subject of highly 
politicized debates within Rwanda and arguments within academia. Scholars must rely on 
scant evidence from linguistic patterns, inferences using neighboring historical accounts, 
and collective Rwandan memories to try and piece together a substantiated, yet still 
imperfect, history of these identities.    
Pre-colonial history in Rwanda is very important politically because the RPF puts 
it on a pedestal as a golden time of unity and peace. Examination of how Rwandan identity 
is portrayed officially shows that there are key deviations in its interpretation from the 
findings of researchers. The Rwandan government uses an altered version of pre-colonial 
history with the goal of supporting its assertions that Rwandans are inherently one nation 
with a long tradition of unity. Meanwhile, academic analyses suggest that intergroup 
divisions likely began as geographic and were then translated into unequal economic and 
political identities during the precolonial period. The government plainly argues against 
theories that would give fuel to separations within the population and clearly selects a 
history that aids its unified identity construction.  
The question ‘Can you tell the difference just from looking at a Rwandan?’ seems 
to consistently arise with regard to the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Outsiders in Rwanda have 
claimed that the Tutsi are taller, more lightly pigmented, and have elongated features. 
Hutus have been described as shorter and darker-skinned, resembling other East African 
peoples. In comparison the Twa have historically been classified as ‘pygmies,’ shorter and 
darker than the others. While these observations likely have some truth in a general sense, 
studies of physical differences have been inconclusive and contradictory. A semi-recent 
anthropological study in 1974 found that, on average, Tutsis were about ten centimeters 
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taller than Hutus. 47 Nevertheless, there are countless exceptions to these stereotypes that 
one can find on the streets of Kigali, so many that they hold no weight in the real world. 
The appropriate answer to the aforementioned question is that it is impossible to tell from 
looking at a Rwandan if they are Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, even for Rwandans themselves. And 
it is completely inappropriate to ask.  
The most common academic belief about the origin of the Hutu and Tutsi identities 
is that the ancestors of the Tutsi were pastoral people who migrated to Rwanda, which was 
already inhabited by the Bantu-speaking predecessors of the Hutu and the Twa.48 The 
Tutsi supposedly came from Nilotic regions of Northern Africa and introduced their herds 
of cattle to Rwanda. There is strong linguistic and archaeological evidence that pastoral 
peoples from northern Africa were migrating to regions near Rwanda before the fifteenth 
century, but these patterns are not able to specifically verify the path of the Tutsi.49 
Supporting this migratory theory are pre-colonial myths that consistently speak of the 
Tutsi coming to Rwanda from elsewhere.  
Perhaps some of the most convincing evidence for the migration hypothesis is 
found in a few genetic differences between the groups. A study done in the early 1960s 
found two noteworthy differences between Tutsis and Hutus from a sample of about 600 
people, not a large enough group to draw conclusions from, but large enough be of note. 
Firstly, the sickle-cell trait was found to be almost absent amongst Tutsis, while the trait 
was present amongst Hutus at an above average frequency when compared to other ethnic 
groups from sub-Saharan Africa.50 Another genetic study showed that lactose digestion, a 
purely heritable trait, is remarkably frequent in samples of Tutsis when compared to other 
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African groups, and much less common in Hutus.51 This supports the theory that the Tutsi 
were cattle herders, drinking milk for thousands of years, while the Hutu were not doing 
so.  It also indicates that intermarriage was not common enough through the centuries to 
eliminate all genetic differences between the groups. 
Rwandan government publications, meanwhile, claim that there is “no scientific 
basis” for the most academically accepted theories about multiple migrations bringing the 
Tutsi to Rwanda.52 Theories about the Tutsi traveling from Northern Africa or Ethiopia 
are written off in government-issued school textbooks as mere “speculations.”53 The 
government’s favored theory of migration involves many smaller migrations by many 
groups who converged on the region now known as Rwanda. An alternative theory as to 
why these three, distinct groups have existed within Rwanda for as long as people can 
account for is conspicuously absent. It is understandable to address the weaknesses of the 
migration hypothesis, considering there are no consensuses or definitive answers, but 
official publications and school texts present the information as unequivocally debunked 
when this is not the case.   
 Looking at the research done in the region, it is very likely that the Hutu, Tutsi, 
and Twa have distant, but distinct, geographic origins, though scholars disagree about 
specific region and rate of Tutsi migration to Rwanda. While they question the specifics, 
the evidence leads the majority to believe it is likely that there was a Tutsi migration to 
Rwanda around the fifteenth century. Nevertheless, once they were on the same Rwandan 
hills, the Hutu and Tutsi cohabitated for centuries. Intermarriage between the groups, 
thought not unheard of, was not common.54 While hereditary differences are insignificant 
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today, strong societal delineations remained throughout Rwanda’s history, though their 
nature fluctuated over time. 
 In a day-to-day functional sense, Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa identities were most closely 
associated with economic classes in early pre-colonial Rwanda. The Twa were associated 
with hunter-gatherers, the Hutu with agriculturalists, and the Tutsi with cattle-raisers.55 
As Tutsi pastoralists trickled into Rwanda from other regions, the trade of cattle and 
sharing of agricultural skills by Hutus helped create one cultural group. Because of the 
high value of cattle, the Tutsi controlled the most wealth and were therefore at the top of 
the Rwandan economic pyramid. The value of cattle motivated various forms of clientage 
that developed in the later pre-colonial period. People with cows, predominantly Tutsis, 
would give patrons, typically Hutus, access or ownership over cattle in return for labor and 
political loyalty.   
There were ways for people to move within the groups, however, and this has been 
something the RPF government has focused on to emphasize the unified nature of pre-
colonial Rwanda. Recent studies have disputed black and white depictions of the groups’ 
occupational distinctions, showing that some Hutu raised cattle and a number of Tutsi 
farmed the land.56 Obtaining cattle would “Tutsify” a Hutu, and a Tutsi without cattle 
would be “de-Tutsified”.57 There was synonymy at this point between group membership 
and one’s social class, not someone’s ethnicity or race. When the cases of intergroup 
marriage in pre-colonial Rwanda did arise, brides would adopt the group identity of their 
grooms and then pass that on to their children in a purely patrilineal fashion.58 The 
families still considered themselves homogenously Hutu or Tutsi. No combined 
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Hutu/Tutsi identity ever emerged amongst Rwandans, making the RPF quest for a single, 
national identity based on pre-colonial unity all the more interesting.   
It appears that once a single Rwandan state began to form around the end of the 
fifteenth century, the Hutu and Tutsi identities became more political than economic, and 
more rigid. The new state was most likely a conglomeration of several smaller kingships 
into one large kingdom for the sake of regional economic and military security.59 An 
absolute Tutsi king, mwami, became the center of every sphere and was believed to be the 
divine embodiment of Rwanda.60 The mwami would appoint three prestigious chiefs to 
oversee the minutiae of running the kingdom-- the chief of landholding distributed 
farmland and collected taxes, the chief of men organized military affairs, and the chief of 
the pastures oversaw cattle administration.61 The mwami would appoint fellow Tutsis to 
the key chiefdoms, with one exception. At certain points, there were Hutu chiefs of 
landholding because of their association with agriculture. While Tutsis were clearly in 
control at the higher echelons, the low-level administrators were commonly Hutus with 
allegiances to a Tutsi higher up in the state hierarchy.  
As Rwanda became more politically consolidated in the seventeenth century a ban 
was placed by Tutsi royalty on Hutus or Twas owning cattle and the occupational 
distinctions between the groups became more clear-cut than before. 62 This ended the 
slight economic fluidity that had existed and concentrated wealth, therefore power, in the 
hands of the existing Tutsi class. This ban was a calculated method of control, a way for 
the Tutsi to keep the Hutu and Twa subservient and financially dependent. It is unclear 
how many Tutsi were agriculturalists at different points or how many Hutu were herders, 
                                                 
59 Mamdani, 62. 
60 Prunier, 11. 
61 Ibid., 12. 
62 Ibid., 15. 
Skutch 31 
but the flexibility with which one could move between groups was greatly reduced during 
this period.  
Increasingly powerful Tutsi rulers had to keep their Hutu and Twa subjects 
dedicated to the state’s wellbeing and invested in its growth. There were various ways that 
Hutus were incorporated into the political and cultural spheres. High-ranking Hutus were 
appointed as “royal ritualists,” abiiru, vital for the Rwanda’s spiritual welfare.63 Their 
rituals cleansed and protected the kingdom, considered integral for Rwanda’s survival. 
Perhaps the key element of Rwandan society that brought the three groups together, 
however, was war. The state faced threats from neighbors on all sides and also engaged in 
offensive maneuvers, at times expanding far into what is now the Congo, Uganda, or 
Burundi. In order to be successful, the Rwandan military evolved from an elite force of 
Tutsi warriors to a powerful army enlisting every male, Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.64 The 
battlefield became the most egalitarian aspect of the pre-colonial Rwandan state.  
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa peoples lived within these hierarchies for centuries. The 
unique culture that formed in the Rwandan kingdom produced other important forms of 
identity amongst the population in conjunction with being Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. These 
included a person’s lineage and clan identity, which each had a special function. The most 
intimate identity was a person’s lineage, the relatives they could trace to an actual, 
common ancestor four or five generations back. 65 Lineages were exclusively Hutu, Tutsi, 
or Twa and were the most powerful bonds within the population. As stated before, if 
intermarriage occurred, the woman was assimilated into her husband’s family and they 
considered the homogeneity of a family’s Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa identity to be retained.  
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The societal construct of the clan emerged as one major way in which pre-colonial 
Rwandans identified themselves, and interestingly, all eighteen Rwandan clans had 
assortments of Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas within them.66 Yet heterogeneous clanship did not 
signify fraternity amongst the members, unlike other clans in Africa that were based on 
kinship. Clan members were linked to a symbolic mythical or historical figure that was not 
intended to be factual. One of the primary mechanisms that united the different groups 
into these clans was a patronage system, called ubuhake, in which a client would establish 
loyalty to his patron by adopting the same clan identity. The client’s offspring would 
continue to be loyal to the offspring of that patron for an indefinite period.67 Historical 
research leads scholars to believe that clan members “did not exhibit any solidarity at all 
and behaved toward each other as complete strangers.”68 These identities were mostly 
political and economic, intended to secure loyalty for a patron and protection for a client. 
The difference between official Rwandan descriptions of clanship and academic 
ones is that the government focuses on the ancient meaning of the clan, which was more 
communal and ritualistic.69 School textbooks explain clanship more fraternally saying it 
is, “defined by actual or perceived descent from a common ancestor” amongst neighbors.70 
The Rwandan government focuses on the early, more egalitarian embodiment of clanship, 
while historians focus predominantly upon the later embodiment of clanship. The earlier 
significance of Rwanda’s eighteen clans is useful for the government today because the 
interethnic clans are pointed to as evidence that there was no division or animosity until 
colonization. An official from the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
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reiterated this, saying the clans’ “existence disproves that the groups could have come from 
different regions. That would be like saying even though we have the same father, you are 
from Ethiopia and I am from Cameroon.”71 However, interviews with Rwandans 
unaffiliated the government reveal that this construct has little to no meaning to them or 
their present-day identities. 
The Rwandan practice of ubuhake is a hotly debated topic among scholars, who 
disagree on whether or not it was used as a form of slavery or exploitation of Hutus and 
Twa by the Tutsi. In the most basic form of ubuhake a client sought out a patron and 
pledged the servitude of his family and its future generations. In exchange, the client and 
his family were granted one or more cows for their use and the economic and physical 
protection of the patron. However, only the patron could dissolve this relationship once it 
was established and, if he did, the client would have to return every single cow he had 
acquired, even ones he may have purchased on his own.72 Because the Tutsi controlled the 
vast majority of the cattle, the instances of a powerful Hutu patron are few and far 
between. As the state expanded and became more centralized, it became a necessity for 
Hutus to seek the protection of a Tutsi patron with ample resources.73 Ubuhake dominated 
the economy of Rwanda for centuries. The hereditary nature of the servitude amplified its 
lasting exploitative nature; there was scarce room for upward mobility in current or future 
generations.  
 Those who argue that ubuhake was not exploitative point to the fact that it was 
voluntary on the part of the client, that there were cases of Tutsi clients and that there was 
reciprocity in the relationship. However, many clients were born into hereditary servitude 
and ubuhake had become a backbone of the economy, creating intense pressure for people 
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to seek out patronage if they were unaffiliated. There was little ability to support oneself 
in Rwanda outside of this institution. So while a client may have voluntarily walked to a 
patron and asked to strike a deal, his only real alternative was to have chosen another 
patron. The Tutsi clients of ubuhake likely had administrative duties tying them to Tutsi 
patrons and probably had their own Hutu clients. Any Tutsi clients who worked the land 
in exchange for a cow were a lower caste within the Tutsi group. Lastly the reciprocity of 
ubuhake, the exchange of a cow for labor, was weak because the cow could always be 
revoked and the client could not legally break his relationship with the patron.  
Ubuhake and other forms of Hutu labor are explicitly attacked in official histories 
because they work against the RPF’s goals. Research endorsed by the Kagame’s office 
claims that the use of ubuhake as a “political instrument of exploitation, domination and 
oppression tailored by the Tutsis to easily enslave the Hutus… [is] not based on any 
scientific fact.”74 The research then cites statistics that show a minority of Rwandans were 
involved in the system and that it did not primarily target Hutu clients.75 Yet the statistics 
they reference were collected from 1910-1920 in the most heavily concentrated area of 
Tutsis in Rwanda, with no mention of sample size, sampling technique, or methods. 
Evidence from this area misrepresents the practice as less prevalent because there were 
fewer Hutus to form client relationships with than in the rest of the country. There were 
also more instances than usual of Tutsi-Tutsi ubuhake relationships in this area. It is a 
misleading statistic for the government to use. 
Other social developments that would play a role in defining intergroup identity 
came during one of the last breaths of the Rwandan state before colonization. These were 
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ibikingi and ubureetwa.76 When war chiefs or generals, predominantly Tutsis, performed 
particularly well, they were gifted large swaths of land by the mwami or another upper 
level official through ibikingi. Farmers, typically Hutus, may have already inhabited this 
land, and if so they became the tenants of this war chief and suddenly owed him rent. To 
pay their new “landlord” the Hutu tenants were required to perform ubureetwa, which 
was working for free for this war chief or general. This was considered “the most hated and 
humiliating… it symbolized the servitude of the Hutu vis-à-vis the dominant minority.”77 
Tutsi tenants of ibikingi were either given supervisory roles in ubureetwa or exempted, 
unlike Hutus. This was one example of how segregated pre-colonial Rwanda was on the 
eve of colonization. In contrast to ubuhake, in which there was at least the physical 
exchange of a cow, ubureetwa and ibikingi were explicitly exploitative. The Rwandan 
kingdom was not totally centralized, so these practices were more prevalent in certain 
areas, but nonetheless there was a trend of increasing subordination of Hutus by Tutsis.   
This was the status of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities in Rwanda until 
colonization when radical changes in identity took place. As academic research shows, a 
lot is unknown about the origins of these identities, but fluctuating levels of division 
between the groups always kept them separate. Most likely, the Tutsi migrated to Rwanda 
from northern regions and settled amongst the Hutu and Twa with their cattle. A common 
culture was born between the groups as they lived together for millennia, though ethnic 
intermarriage was never normative enough to neutralize the categories or meld them into 
a single, Rwandan people. Yet the current government attributes blame for the genocide 
only on the changes that would take place during colonization and looks back on the pre-
colonial period through rose-colored glasses as a time of bucolic harmony.  
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 
Colonial Rwandan Identities 
Colonization deepened inter-group divisions and amplified existing antagonisms 
as Europeans coopted pre-colonial power structures to rule Rwanda. For colonial 
administrators, Rwanda was something of a dream to be tasked with. On the lush, green 
hills existed a highly developed state structure with efficient administrative channels and 
relatively centralized power. Explorers documented an elite governing class, the Tutsi, 
effectively controlling the rest of the population, the Hutu and Twa. When Europeans 
managed to secure the loyalty of the mwami and the top Tutsi echelon of the society, they 
had an effective way to control the whole country with minimal manpower or cost.  
In general, the Rwandan histories tend to overstate the importance of colonial 
policies and changes on dividing the Rwandan people, downplaying divisions that had 
previously existed. Rwandan publications describe Belgian colonization transforming “the 
values of the indigenous people, creating a new mind/identity that still remain 
problematic.”78 A secondary-school history book recounts the removal of Hutu chiefs by 
the Belgians as “the basis for the future political crisis that destroyed the nation.”79 The 
central issue with the Rwandan interpretation of colonization is its overemphasis on the 
divisive nature of colonization and its tendency to underemphasize other cultural divisions 
outside of it.   
As Africa was colonized in the 1700s and 1800s, there was a classification 
obsession sweeping the anthropological and scientific communities. Blood types, insects, 
viruses, and humans were being divided and labeled according to ascribed distinctions, 
some correct and some contrived. Race was one major category that humans were being 
divided into and Caucasians were believed to be the ideal. This discriminatory philosophy 
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led many Europeans to adopt the conviction that any civilization in Africa was due to the 
influence of a Caucasoid invader in the past. Europeans considered black Africans 
incapable of creating a high level of social complexity. The combination of these two 
beliefs, combined with the Europeans’ desire to explain developed African states, like 
Rwanda’s, fed into the “Hamitic hypothesis.”  
In Genesis 9 of the Biblical Old Testament, Noah (of Noah’s ark) is passed out 
drunk one night and his three sons stumble upon his naked, sleeping body. Two of them 
shield their eyes out of respect for their father and go fetch a blanket, but the third son, 
Ham, does not avert his gaze. When Noah finds out that Ham intentionally looked at his 
drunken, naked body he is irate. Noah curses Ham’s son, Canaan, to punish the 
transgression and says, “A slave of slaves shall he be to his brothers.”80 Early translations 
from the Hebrew version of this story mistranslated the name Ham as also meaning ‘black’ 
or ‘dark.’ From this misinterpretation sprung the common belief that Noah had cursed 
Ham with dark skin and his son with slavery.81 However, skin color is never mentioned in 
the ancient Jewish or early Christian versions of the story and there is never a connection 
between skin color and slavery.82 Nonetheless, since the seventh century C.E. accounts of 
Noah’s curse on Ham connect slavery and dark complexions. This distorted myth had 
devastating consequences for Africa beginning in the late-1700s.  
The Hamitic hypothesis was applied to African peoples for the first time with the 
Egyptians in the 1790s. Europeans decided that “Negroids” from Africa could not have 
produced the oldest civilization in the world and were determined to find an alternate 
explanation for Egypt’s remarkable history.83 It was convenient that the average 
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phenotype for an Egyptian was lighter pigmented than the tones typically found in the rest 
of Africa. Turning to the Bible for reference, they traced the Egyptians back to being 
descendants of one of Ham’s uncursed sons, Miziram.84 It was concluded that the 
Egyptians were not the cursed Negroid sons of Canaan, but uncursed Caucasoid sons of 
Miziram, who they called “Hamites.” This supported their racist theory that Negroid 
Africans were too incompetent for state building and offered a more agreeable explanation 
for the undeniable advancement that existed in many African cultures.85 The term 
“Hamite” was expanded to apply to numerous groups in Africa with lighter skin and taller 
frames that existed within established state structures. The Tutsi of Rwanda were among 
the new group of “Hamitic” peoples.   
When Germany, Rwanda’s first colonizer, arrived in 1897 it quickly enlisted the 
Tutsis’ support. The Germans were largely absent as colonizers due to World War One, 
which they were fighting across Europe. In 1914 only ninety-six Germans were in the 
country, and a handful of those were missionaries unaffiliated with state duties. 86 The 
Tutsi chiefs remained completely in charge for all intents and purposes. With the material 
support of Germany, however, the mwami and his chiefs saw that they could be more 
forceful and demanding of their Hutu and Twa subjects. They increased the number of 
crops that had to be produced and the hours of communal labor that the Hutu and Twa 
were required to do. At the end of World War One, with Germany’s loss, Rwanda was re-
allocated to Belgium and the nature of their colonization changed.  
In 1916, Belgium quietly slipped into its role as a colonizer, but would eventually 
alter the fabric of Rwandan society in fundamental ways. The first few years of their 
colonization did not create many ripples, the Belgians observed and assessed the status 
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quo. It was not until the mid-1920s that observers and historians were able to identify 
notable changes resulting from their presence in Rwanda. The Belgians conspicuously 
made the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa identities racial for the first time, using the Hamitic 
hypothesis, as opposed to economic or political.  
The Belgians might have subscribed to the Hamitic hypothesis as either a 
psychological method of control or because they truly believed in it, but regardless they 
introduced and instilled it in Rwandans. Identity took on a new, polarizing dimension as 
Belgian officials discussed it in racially-charged terms.  
“The Bahima [Tutsis] differ absolutely by the beauty of their features and their light 
colour from the Bantu agriculturalists of an inferior type” (Mgr. Le Roy).87 
 
“We can see Caucasian skulls and beautiful Greek profiles side-by-side with 
Semitic and even Jewish features, elegant golden-red beauties” (J. van den 
Burgt).88 
 
“The Batutsi were designed to reign…over the inferior races that surround them” 
(Pierre Ryckmans, Belgian Governor General).89 
 
It was convenient that Rwandan origin stories already presented the Tutsi as outsiders 
who immigrated from the North. The Belgians used this as evidence that the Hamitic 
hypothesis and its racial ramifications were undeniable facts.90 Belgian legislation 
mirrored these beliefs and continued to revere Tutsis as superior while further exploiting 
Hutus. The seeds of the Hamitic hypothesis would catapult Rwandan inter-group 
antagonisms to genocidal levels at the end of the century.   
One of the first major changes the Belgians made was completely overhauling the 
Rwandan government system, redefining Rwandan identity in the process. Low-level 
Hutu chiefs were eliminated and replaced by Tutsis, who Belgians believed to be natural 
leaders. The three major chiefdoms that had operated beneath the mwami were abolished 
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and their power was concentrated in his hands; he only had to report to the Belgians.91 To 
the dismay of the mwami, however, reporting to the Belgians was no small task. He no 
longer had judicial autonomy and was not allowed to appoint chiefs without explicit 
consent.92 The abolition of local Hutu chiefs silenced the last voice that the group had 
exercised in any official arena and Hutus would become more and more subjugated as 
time passed under the Belgians.  
 Belgian taxation and compulsory crop production transformed the role of Tutsi 
chiefs and resulted in the clearest polarization between the groups. Tutsis were both 
emboldened and threatened by their relationship with the colonizers. They were 
personally responsible for meeting economic quotas and keeping order amongst the Hutu 
in their jurisdictions, but if they did this adequately the Belgians would not interfere in 
any of their affairs.93 A Tutsi who had been a chief under the Belgians recalled the 
sentiment being, “You whip the Hutu or we will whip you.”94 If a Tutsi chief was confident 
that he had met the Belgians’ administrative expectations, it became common practice for 
him to levy additional taxes, unsanctioned by the Belgians, on Hutus or to require them to 
perform additional, unpaid labor for his personal benefit.95 The further exploitation of 
Hutus by Tutsis, outside of the colonial structure, resulted in great resentment.  
To meet Belgian economic goals, the detested pre-colonial practice of ubureetwa 
labor was revamped in 1924 and landed squarely on the shoulders of Hutus with crushing 
weight. This highlighted the distinction between the groups starkly. Before colonization 
“petit- Tutsis,” poorer Tutsis, would have participated in ubureetwa and wealthy Hutus 
would not have.96 Now all Tutsis were exempt and all Hutus were obligated to participate. 
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Some petit-Tutsis reveled in their new status and walked onto the fields of their toiling 
Hutu neighbors, taking yams or bananas; the Hutu could not protest.97 The Belgians were 
fond of distorting pre-colonial practices like ubureetwa and then referring to them as 
“customary” laws of the Rwandan people, when in reality there was only a meager lasting 
resemblance.  
  Catholicism was ushered into Rwanda by the Belgians and eventually became one 
of the most powerful influences on identity and government, lasting long past colonization 
itself. The Belgians endorsed Catholicism and tied it to the political sphere, leading to a 
“massive enrollment in the Catholic army,” one priest in Rwandan recalled in 1930.98  
Christian missionaries had operated in Rwanda for many decades prior, and while they 
had not converted a large number of the population they knew Rwanda much better than 
any Belgian did. These missionaries were a very valuable resource for the new colonizers. 
Catholicism was the main tool used to “civilize” Rwandans according to European 
standards, denouncing polygamy and paganism, encouraging hard work and piety.99 The 
religious aspects of the church did not become accepted as rapidly as the political benefits 
of joining it did. This remained a struggle for the Belgians who wished to do away with the 
overtly African aspects of the culture.  
 In 1931 the Belgians deposed King Musinga, the last Rwandan king to be selected 
by the sacred abiiru ritualists. One of his sons, King Mutara III Rudahigwa was selected 
by the Belgians to replace him without any consultation with the traditional power 
structures. This caused many Rwandans to deny Mutara’s legitimacy.100 Unlike his father, 
he adopted Christianity, wore European clothes, and was not polygamous. Rwandans 
referred to him as mwami w’abazungu, or the “King of the Whites”. Mutara publicly 
                                                 
97 Mamdani, 97.  
98 Prunier, 32.  
99 Ibid., 32.  
100 Ibid., 31. 
Skutch 42 
discarded the divine status of the mwami, which had been a key aspect of Rwandan culture 
since the beginning of the pre-colonial state.101 The insertion of Mutara onto the throne by 
the Belgians was a major blow for the people and Rwandan culture.  
 One of the Catholic Church’s biggest areas of influence was formalized education, 
which they had a monopoly over. The Church gave the Tutsi sons of chiefs and wealthy 
families a lot of attention because it saw them as the impressionable, future leaders of 
Rwanda.102 The Church and Belgian state hoped to gain their loyalty early on and 
indoctrinate them with Christian and Western principles. Church education explicitly 
perpetuated the Hamitic hypothesis and enforced the racialization of the groups.  The 
Tutsi sons sent to the Church’s schools were taught that they were entitled to rule Rwanda 
by virtue of their superior racial origins.103 Illiteracy rates remained extremely high outside 
of elite circles because education was not easily accessible to Tutsis from less influential 
families, virtually any Hutus, and no females. When a Hutu did graduate from school, he 
usually faced an even larger challenge finding employment outside of manual labor.104 The 
blatant educational discrimination that existed bred much intergroup antagonism and was 
one of the biggest points of strife upon independence.  
 In 1933 the Belgians conducted a national census and issued identity cards that 
identified the “race” of each Rwandan.105 These Belgian racial distinctions lasted through 
the 1994 genocide, when an identification card marked “Tutsi” was a death sentence for 
hundreds of thousands of people. What little fluidity or class mobility had survived the 
late pre-colonial and early colonial stages was crushed, and national unity disappeared 
with each generation born into these conditions. Though the basis for Belgian 
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identification as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa remains murky, there is a persistent claim by the RPF 
government that a “ten-cow rule” existed, anyone with ten cows or more was deemed a 
Tutsi. This seems unlikely to be the only measure because it is possible to surmise the 
approximate number of cows in Rwanda from 1933 to 1934 and there would be far fewer 
Tutsis if this had been the only criterion.106 It is very likely that existing church records 
denoting one’s ethnic group, like marriage licenses or birth certificates, were the 
predominant source used in identification.107 The current government’s endorsement of 
the “ten-cow rule” is likely because it allows them to argue for the arbitrary nature of ethnic 
divisions more easily.  
 The colonial period transformed identity in Rwanda and made it racial, 
proclaiming the inherent superiority of the Tutsi “race.” Though impossible to determine 
the causal effects of colonization on the 1994 genocide, a substantial amount of blame can 
be placed on the Belgian authorities and Catholic Church.  
 
 Academic research offers scant concrete evidence about the origins of the Hutu, 
Tutsi, and Twa, but it does show that for as far back as history can be traced there were 
three distinct groups living together in the country. At each stage certain things prevented 
the three from coalescing into a singular group, economic, political, and then racially 
charged power imbalances never organically dissipated. Pre-colonial Rwanda was not 
classified by intermarriage and intergroup mobility, as the government would like people 
to believe, but it was not until colonization that the groups became racial and immutable. 
The seeds of genocide were sown during Belgium’s reign over Rwanda, but the soil was 
growing fertile for those seeds of intergroup discord to be sown before European contact 
was made.   
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Chapter 3: The Complexity of the RPF  

The laws and official policies of Rwanda have clearly stated objectives with regard 
to creating a new identity, but the reality of the government’s behaviors is quite perplexing 
because they seem to draw upon ethnic divisions to justify many of their actions. When 
the new Rwandan constitution was written in 1996, then revised in 2003, it had a clear 
purpose of creating a new identity, preventing another genocide, and repatriating the 
millions of Rwandan refugees who remained in camps outside of the country. The very 
preamble of the Rwandan constitution is dedicated to national identity construction and 
ending genocidal divisionism. But the way the RPF has conducted itself runs counter to its 
proclamations that everyone in Rwanda is an equal in the eyes of the law and it seems that 
its primary agenda is actually eliminating political opposition. 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front, when interpreted based on its actions, not its words, 
is a party that is intent on self-preservation first and foremost. It has shown that it will go 
to any lengths necessary, political assassinations or foreign coups, to keep its grip on 
Rwanda unchallenged so it can carry out its agenda. The RPF relies on force and fear to 
protect itself as it works towards the goal of creating a new national identity.  

Laws of Intimidation 
The keys to building identity in Rwanda come right from its constitution, which 
gives the government the muscle it needs to forcibly impose a new identity on the people 
until it is fully adopted. Article 13 of this document declares that the vague crimes of 
“revisionism, negationism, and trivialization of genocide are punishable by law.” This 
article is meant to prevent people from challenging the Tutsi death toll, the issue of RPF 
revenge against the Hutu, and anyone who claims the government’s policies are not in the 
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nation’s best interests. This article has been used by the RPF repeatedly, brandished to 
prosecute or intimidate scores of Rwandans, from subsistence farmers up to a former 
president, Pasteur Bizimungu. The lack of clarity in the article gives the government 
leeway in tagging people as “genocide revisionists” or spreaders of “divisionism” and then 
taking legal action to silence them. Another important section, Article 24, states that 
“every Rwandan has the right to his or her country and no Rwandan shall be banished 
from the country.” Accordingly, Rwandan refugees are intensely pressured by the 
international community to return because of the welcoming government, which many of 
them feel is a wolf in sheep’s clothing.  
Two of the most salient crimes that the RPF accuses people of committing are 
spreading “divisionism” and spreading “genocide ideology.” Divisionism, formerly known 
as sectarianism, is outlined in a 2001 law that reads, “The practice of sectarianism is a 
crime committed by any oral or written expression or any act of divisionism that could 
generate conflicts among the population or cause disputes.”108 Anyone convicted of this 
crime can serve up to five years and lose their civil rights permanently. The law against 
spreading genocide ideology is more serious, guilty parties serve between ten and fifteen 
years for “revisionism, negationism, and trivialization of genocide,” as mentioned in the 
constitution’s thirteenth article. The specific criteria one must meet in order to qualify as 
guilty are not outlined by the constitution or the laws themselves.109 The fuzziness of the 
description and criteria for these crimes, and the readiness with which the government 
makes these allegations, leads to fear among Rwandans of breaking them rather than 
principled adherence to them.  
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Dissenting political opinions, by Hutus and Tutsis, are rarely voiced because 
Kagame and his government have reacted so harshly over the past two decades toward this 
candid minority. Most ominously, a handful of public figures who have spoken out about 
the government’s strict policies have been assassinated at home and abroad.110 The first 
high profile assassination was of Seth Sendashonga, a former minister in the government, 
in 1998. After speaking out about egregious actions by RPF soldiers in the year following 
the genocide, he was assassinated while exiled in Kenya.111 It is believed to have been the 
work of an operative contracted by the Rwandan government; Sendashonga had survived 
an earlier assassination attempt and publicly reported numerous threats by Rwandan 
officials during his time in Kenya.  
This pattern of threats, suspicious deaths, and then odd failures to investigate or 
prosecute the killings has become a well-known fate for the RPF’s critics.112 As recently as 
2010 and 2014 there have been foreign assassinations and attempts that are likely the 
work of the Rwandan government. After Patrick Karegeya, Rwanda’s former Head of 
External Intelligence, was murdered in South Africa in January of 2014, Rwandan Prime 
Minister Pierre Damien Habumuremyi tweeted: “Betraying citizens and their country that 
made you a man shall always bear consequences to you.”113 Paul Kagame himself had a 
much more ominous speech after one of these suspicious deaths:  
“Whoever betrays the country will pay the price. I assure you. Letting down a 
country, wishing harm on people, you end up suffering the negative 
consequences. Any person still alive who may be plotting against Rwanda, 
whoever they are, will pay the price…Whoever it is, it is a matter of time…I hear 
some of our people saying: we are not the ones who did it. It’s true they were not 
the ones who did it, but that is not my concern, because you should be doing it… 
What is surprising is that you are not doing it. People who dare to betray, betray 
the country!”114  
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These words and his actions clearly show that no one is safe and no one can criticize the 
government because Kagame and the RPF have no fear of taking revenge. It instills terror 
and then they take advantage of the ensuing obedience.  
One prime example of the nebulous, self-serving application of laws by the RPF 
was their destruction and deterrence of competing political parties during the 2003 
presidential elections. The Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) entered 
Faustin Twagiramungu as Kagame’s competitor in the election. Twagiramungu had been 
appointed Prime Minister in 1994 by Kagame, but was disgracefully removed in 1995 after 
being one of the open critics of RPF aggression toward Hutu civilians.115 In May of 2003 
the MDR was disbanded by parliament for promoting “divisionism,” with no concrete 
evidence, and forty-six people were publicly identified as its leaders. Seven of those people 
went missing and two are presumed to be dead at the hands of the Rwandan Intelligence 
Service.116 Twagiramungu fled to Belgium with his family, where he remains to this day. 
In another incident, after attempting to form their own political party in 2002 the former 
president, Pasteur Bizimungu, and a government minister were indefinitely put on house 
arrest and denied the ability to speak with any outside sources for five years.   
The Rwandan people have witnessed the government brandishing these damaging 
accusations with such looseness that it has created a paralyzing fear in the population of 
drawing the government’s wrath, stunting even personal conversations. From 2007 to 
2008, 1,304 people were tried for crimes of divisionism or promoting genocide ideology, 
and only 102 people were acquitted.117 An allegation is almost synonymous with guilt. A 
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prominent Kigali preacher, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that discussions 
in families about ethnicity were “taboo…secretive and whispered about only when 
necessary because people think that they can get in serious trouble.”118  
Yet, when the Unity and National Identity Regional Coordinator for Kigali was 
asked about the government’s vague laws potentially creating paralyzing fears and silence, 
she wrote it off saying, “It’s impossible for anyone to have a misunderstanding about 
clearly printed laws.”119 She has “never, never, never, never, never” heard of a problem 
with people being wrongly accused or denied a speedy trial when suspected of violating 
one of the constitutional articles on genocidal ideology. Her effusive statements flew in the 
face of numerous people who refused to be interviewed on topics like the history curricula 
or Ndi Umunyarwanda, all of which are government-sponsored and should fall under the 
category of “impossible” to misunderstand. This very Unity and National Identity 
Coordinator refused to speak personally on laws related to the topics in her job title, but 
referred all inquiries back to the text of the constitution.  

Patriotism vs. Indoctrination 
While the constitution sought to tackle the issue of national identity formation in 
a number of ways, one of the most direct and explicit was through the organization of 
patriotism camps, mandated in Article 8. The inspiration for these camps was drawn from 
pre-colonial Rwanda where young boys would participate in cultural schools, itorero, 
which helped them serve the state when they grew up and indoctrinated them with 
Rwandan values.120 The reincarnation of these camps in in 1996 was intended to “endorse 
patriotic values, national unity and reconciliation and eradicate genocide ideology through 
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shared experiences.”121 Pre-colonial itorero camps were traditionally reserved for Tutsis, 
so despite the fact that they inspired the modern camps, the government chose to refer to 
the new programs as ingando instead.122  
These programs began in an effort to repatriate the millions of Tutsis living abroad 
and the more recent Hutu refugees, but in 2007 ingando expanded to include members of 
Rwandan civil society, secondary students, and university students. The expanded branch 
of the program was given the precolonial name, itorero. The commission hopes to make 
participation in itorero camps mandatory for all youth between the ages of eighteen and 
thirty-five by 2017. In the government’s ideal world, the entire population would graduate 
from these programs and accept the tenets of unification they are teaching.  
 Ingando primarily serves returnees, repatriating refugees, and former prisoners, 
aiming to “make them good Rwandans,” in the words of a National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission official 123 The first graduates of the camps were Tutsis who 
had been in exile for decades and out of touch with their Rwandan backgrounds.124 The 
government used the camps to reeducate them on traditional culture and the RPF’s 
national history curriculum promoting unity. After the first waves of Tutsi returnees 
graduated, the RPF repurposed the camps to mainly serve repatriating Hutu refugees and 
released prisoners. The classes taught today in ingando include civic education, national 
history, methods of reconciliation, and courses on Rwandan customs that bind people 
through their shared culture.  
Kagame and the RPF government believe that repatriating all the former 
genocidaires and Hutu combatants is vital for the eradication of genocidal divisionism. 
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This is the reason for the constitutional provision encouraging all Rwandans to return 
from abroad and live within the country, where they can be supervised. This policy 
undermines refugees’ ability to argue that they still are in need of political asylum. In the 
RPF’s opinion it is safer to have contentious groups within Rwanda where they can be 
monitored, as opposed to shrouded in secrecy in the DRC or elsewhere. A mandatory, two-
month stay at ingando is one of the most important ways that the government 
demilitarizes former aggressors and attempts to shape them into Rwandan citizens that 
no longer pose a threat.125 Some of the former Rwandan combatants from the Congo have 
been incorporated into the Rwandan Defense Force based on their previous military 
experience. The RDF is alleged to have an aggressive recruiting campaign to bring the 
highest ranking and most talented soldiers from opposition groups in with the promise of 
money and amnesty for their former crimes.126 Those who they cannot convert are jailed 
and brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. This is one way that 
Kagame and the RPF can weaken and monitor the opposition, while simultaneously 
bolstering their own ranks.  
Very controversially, upon graduation from ingando some former Hutu 
combatants receive economic assistance from the government to encourage their 
loyalty.127 It appears that Kagame is willing to go to great lengths to diffuse threats of 
further ethnic violence, even at the cost of public opinion. Giving money to genocide 
perpetrators is quite contentious within Rwanda and outside of it.128 Actions like these, 
conducted along poorly disguised ethnic lines, arguably prolong divisions in the 
population and impede the government’s goal of creating a single identity.   
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Itorero, on the other hand, is a tool intended to cultivate the future leaders of 
Rwanda, but often accused of being a tool used by the government to create the next 
generation of RPF purists. Since it grew out of ingando in 2007 there have been 284,209 
graduates from the program.129 There are three phases to itorero: mobilization and 
training, placement and serving, and then graduation.130 The modules included in the 
mobilization and training curriculum are nation building, character building, national 
service, and physical development, which includes basic military training.131 This typically 
takes place at a camp for two weeks and then students go back to their homes to carry out 
the placement and service portion of itorero. This phase includes community works 
projects across the country, which are intended to demonstrate national cohesion and 
ethnic cooperation. One participant interviewed went door to door asking if people had 
registered for national identity cards, and if they had not he provided them with the 
necessary forms.132 If all of these phases are completed successfully the participant 
receives a certificate of graduation and is expected to continue spreading messages of 
reconciliation and unity through their actions and service to Rwanda. 
   Itorero’s intensity seems to perpetuate fear of authority in many instead of 
producing the quintessential “Rwandan” leaders it proclaims to mold. The days start at four 
in the morning with aggressive army drills, there is limited food, the civic and history 
lessons carry on for many hours, and sleep is scarce.133 There have been beatings and 
inappropriate sexual relationships between male instructors and students reportedly used 
to punish participants for minor infractions during their time in the camps. One 
interviewee, a college freshman who had completed the program the summer before, 
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showed the interviewer scars running across his back that he says came from camp 
instructors.134 Multiple graduates repeated answers to questions that were seemingly 
regurgitated verbatim, for instance effusive statements like “the Government of National 
Unity works for all Rwandans teaching forgiveness and opens their arms every single 
person.”135 Despite the intentions of the program, the main takeaway seems to be not to 
question the RPF or their policies above all else.   
 A pervasive culture of obedience was one of the things that allowed the 1994 
genocide to be perpetrated so rapidly as people followed Hutu leaders telling them to 
massacre their neighbors, and it seems as if the RPF is playing on the same culture to 
coerce behavior today and construct a new identity. While their efforts are more innocuous 
than genocide, it is unsustainable to play on fear and indoctrination as a method of 
maintaining order. An official from the National Itorero Commission described Rwanda’s 
history of hierarchical deference as an inalienable characteristic of its people, “We have 
respect for authority because of having a monarchy for almost a millennium.”136 This type 
of hierarchy does not seem to be able to break out of an ethnic mold and if the RPF relies 
on it, it will perpetuate cycles of fear, obedience, and violence. Instead of supporting 
tolerance, Kagame and his government are attempting to force, not necessarily foster, the 
eradication of ethnic differences that have been around for as long as Rwandans can 
remember.  
 
The Menace across the Border 
 
 
Embedded in the hordes of innocent, fleeing Hutus after the genocide were most 
of the perpetrators and leaders of the genocide. The most radical of them carried their 
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genocidal wrath into the mountains of Eastern Zaire and regrouped there, forming the 
Hutu terrorist group that would become the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR’s key objective has always been to overthrow the RPF 
government, that “Tutsi Empire.” The RPF claims that the FDLR’s sinister goals also 
include completing the genocide of the Tutsi.137 As of 2015, they were classified as the 
largest and most dangerous armed group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
formerly Zaire.138 They are the largest physical warning of the possible continuation of the 
Rwandan genocide and keep the population on edge.   
In the eyes of the current Rwandan government, the FDLR is an intolerable and 
perilous national security threat that cannot be understated because it is the embodiment 
of the genocide. The conflict between the FDLR and the RPF government rooted in the 
fact that both sides view the other as the embodiment of all Rwandan ills. It is a key 
objective of the RPF to destroy this group, and it has demonstrated that it will go to 
astounding lengths to accomplish these aims. The FDLR is one of the major factors that 
keeps ethnicity alive in Rwanda as the RPF repeatedly denounces and attacks the group, 
who is actively attempting to project Hutu Power into Rwanda from across the border.  
Demonstrating its brazen commitment to destroying the FDLR and all forms of 
Hutu extremism in the region, Rwanda has unabashedly interfered in Congolese politics 
numerous times. When leaders in Kinshasa will not fully endorse aggressive agendas to 
eradicate the FDLR, Rwanda’s government reliably takes matters into its own hands. Since 
1996 it has surreptitiously and blatantly supported two coup d’états in the DRC with the 
goal of eliminating Hutu extremism from its neighbor’s Eastern provinces. The first coup 
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was successful, driving out the long-standing despot, Mobutu Sese Seko.139 Claiming 
Mobutu’s successor was still not taking enough action against the FDLR, Rwanda 
militarily and financially supported yet another coup in 1998, which was unsuccessful.140 
A proxy war ensued with the DRC compensating the FDLR to actively fight against 
Rwandan aggression until about 2004.141 Then the Congolese government changed course, 
deciding it would rather end any Rwandan pretext for meddling than continue to fight 
unproductive battles. The two eventually entered into a joint-offensive mission against the 
FDLR in 2009.142 This Congolese policy pivot has been a great blow to the group and 
changed their behavior to focus on survival rather than offense. 
 The FDLR grew out of a dreadfully successful genocidal regime that had already 
demonstrated organizational complexity and garnered mass allegiance. Consequently, 
post-genocide refugee camps were bursting with panicked Hutus who had been coerced 
into committing crimes during the violence and a radical faction that wanted to continue 
the genocide. Most believed that returning to Rwanda meant certain death at the hands of 
a new “Tutsi regime.” It was easy for the early FDLR to convince men to join their group 
from this pool of despairing refugees. They promised to improve the men’s immediate 
quality of life, fight to overthrow the RPF government, and bring Hutus back to Rwanda 
victoriously. The terrorist organization sowed its roots in an intact force of 35,000 Hutu 
militiamen that had operated during the genocide and attracted enough support to swell 
to 100,000 members by 1996.143  
 At its genesis, collective action problems were overcome by manipulating historical 
fears and taking advantage of Rwanda’s culture of obedience. In the period of relative 
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peace since the genocide these tensions have become harder to manipulate, but fear and 
obedience are still entwined in the FDLR’s rhetoric. The group circulates stories that an 
aggressive campaign is being carried out by the RPF government against Hutus, which 
many find believable based on Rwanda’s history of ethnic conflict.144 Prevented from 
assimilating into the DRC, the FDLR still leads refugees to believe that they must fight to 
return to Rwanda or resign to a miserable life in the camps. With a top-down command 
structure and an ethnically-charged rallying cry, the FDLR has managed to survive in the 
forests of the DRC for twenty-two years.  
 One of the biggest reasons the FDLR has survived is that it is active in the black 
market sale of minerals and natural resources from lucrative mines in the DRC and the 
group has a level of financial autonomy that allows them to offer selective benefits to their 
members and bribes to DRC officials.145 Their economic assets grant FDLR fighters and 
their families significantly more material comfort and security than refugee camps can. 
The survival of the FDLR is contingent in part upon its leaders continuing to be able to 
offer a higher quality of life to Hutus in exile than the refugee camps can. 
 At present, the ultimate strength of the FDLR stems from its ethnic homogeneity 
and its members’ hardline views. In the twenty-two years since the FDLR has been in 
existence, its moderate and less committed members have all been pulled away as the 
Rwandan government has worked to allay their worries about repatriation. The most 
radical rebels have even resorted to physically preventing masses of defectors from 
returning to Rwanda at times.146 Today, the FDLR is down from about 6,000 fighters in 
2007 to around 2,000.147 The present-day FDLR is comprised mainly of fanatics who have 
chosen to stay and battle rather than to set aside ethnic antagonisms. Recent recruits have 
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mostly been Hutus from the Congo, Tanzania, and Burundi who believe in fighting against 
any form of “Tutsi oppression,” including the Rwandan government.148 These new recruits 
are cause for worry because they indicate that a larger group of sympathizers exists outside 
of the radical Hutu remnants of the genocide. A greater ethnic conflict could be sparked if 
the FDLR engages with the Rwandan army directly or if Hutus in the region feel 
threatened by Tutsi aggressions.  
The FDLR attempts to use violence to provoke the RPF into chasing them across 
the Congolese border, knowing this cross-border invasion would likely result in another 
state conflict between the DRC and Rwanda. With Rwanda’s history of supporting rebel 
groups and coups in the DRC, the Kinshasa government is highly wary of any 
infringements and the tenuous goodwill between the two nations could collapse with 
FDLR provocation.149  If a larger conflict happens, the group hopes to infiltrate Rwanda 
and undermine RPF control. Over the past two decades, the FDLR has repeatedly 
attempted to do instigate a situation like this, crossing into Rwanda and killing numerous 
civilians or attempting sabotage. So far, the Rwandan army has not taken its bait.150 The 
FDLR believes that if it can spark a regional conflict by drawing the RPF into the DRC, 
there will be room for them to lead a movement into Rwanda and potentially topple the 
“Tutsi” regime. The FDLR’s lack of success is likely because of its reduced numbers and 
power, but if it grows stronger this is not an unforeseeable occurrence.  
 The methods of violence characteristic of the FDLR include small arms, grenades, 
and machetes reminiscent of the 1994 genocide. Since 2004 about sixty-seven deaths are 
annually attributed to the FDLR, with the exception being the year of the joint Rwandan-
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Congolese offensive, 2009, during which the FDLR’s death toll was 1,590.151 After 2004, 
when they stopped receiving Congolese government support, the most typical activity of 
the group has been raiding villages and government outposts, as well as kidnapping for 
ransom.152 These raids intimidate civilians in the area, deterring opposition, and provide 
the FDLR with basic material necessities. Raids also have the effect of driving civilians 
from key mining areas, allowing the group to secure access to crucial resources and sustain 
its fighters.153 There are allegations that local Congolese officials collude with the FDLR to 
sell minerals on the black market, and in return they give the group space. These low-level 
politicians have an incentive to keep the FDLR safe and it is hypothesized that this is a 
major reason the group has not been eradicated.154  
Since inception, the FDLR has posed more of an existential threat to the Rwandan 
government and people than a tangible one. The group represents the continuation of 
genocidal ideology at a time when many Rwandans feel the fragile nation could still erupt 
with ethnic violence.  Yet most of the violence carried out by the FDLR is perpetrated in 
the DRC and against Congolese citizens during its local raids, making the threat to Rwanda 
less physical than conceptual. The Rwandan government’s public and concerted effort to 
demonstrate benevolence toward repatriated FDLR defectors has steadily eroded many 
rebels’ fears of returning and been very effective in weakening its numbers. Telling fighters 
and recruits that the RPF government will punish, or even murder, them is now known to 
be a false statement. Increased efforts by the Congolese government and the United 
Nations to return Rwandan refugees have also helped to drive FDLR fighters from the 
group.  
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The Rwandan government has relatively good information about the group’s 
current structure, but is not receiving cooperation from the Congolese government 
allowing them to act swiftly or aggressively. A push from the UN, Rwanda, and the DRC 
has been made over the past year to reassess the cases of all Rwandan refugees with the 
hopes of repatriating most of them, potentially ousting members of the FDLR who have 
been blending in as refugees.155 Positive sanctions on the part of the Rwandan government 
also seem to have been highly successful over the years in drawing rebels away from the 
group with the promises of amnesty and repatriation. The UN reported that 700 fighters 
surrendered in 2015 and that many of them were wounded or in poor health, a sign that 
the group is being effected by pressures in place.156 This is a time when the FDLR is at its 
lowest numbers yet, but it also means that many of the remaining rebels are hardline Hutu 
extremists, unwilling to be enticed by the RPF. The vast majority of the moderate and less 
committed members have already left the group. Those left have a penchant for violence 
and a fanatical, anti-Tutsi worldview.  
 
 Rwandans still live under the umbrella of ethnicity every day and the government 
body that has made it a mission to eradicate divisionism is one of the worst culprits 
keeping it alive. It is hard to say if the RPF is intentionally creating a “pro-Tutsi” agenda 
and structure within the government, or if it is reacting to its own fears about the specter 
of Hutu control being restored.  The consequences, either way, are that the old identities 
are not going to be eliminated from the population if the government continues to 
suppress its opposition, restrict discussions on the topic of history, and create new facades 
that poorly mask continued ethnic divisionism. The survival of genocide ideology, 
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embodied by groups like the FDLR, is evidence that Rwanda will need to confront its 
demons with more than intimidation and violence. It seems that the RPF’s actions are 
primarily about self-preservation, and then secondarily about unifying Rwanda.   
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Chapter 4: Growing Up Rwandan 
 
The paradoxes accompanying the rise of Paul Kagame and the RPF political party 
induce confusion in young Rwandans who are grappling with their “Rwandaness” and 
identity. In attempting to conspicuously eradicate it, the divisions visibly exist directly 
beneath the surface of conversations without being addressed. As previously discussed, 
the key to constructing a new Rwandan identity lies in the government’s re-interpretation 
of Rwanda’s history, which they insist on, despite the fact that many families intimately 
know different realities of the past. “This history they teach is the official history, the 
official memory. It is intended to lead to reconciliation, “said a Rwandan historian, Dr. 
Shyaka Aggeé, who was commissioned to help write a new Peace Education Curriculum 
for all public schools.157 Rwandan youths must sort through conflicting narratives of 
history in an environment of fear and whispers, creating great challenges as they try to 
understand who they are in the context of their nation.  
The result of the domineering political environment created by the RPF is that a 
generational gap has come to exist between children who did not directly experience the 
genocide and their parents who are afraid of contradicting the government’s story. This 
has psychological and practical ramifications that threaten to carry the genocide into 
future generations as the complicated aspects of trauma and divisionism remain 
unaddressed. There is a lack of communication at home on topics surrounding the 
genocide, high levels of trauma still present in the population, and confusing messages 
received from multiple sources that create snarls in the search for identity.  
 
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New Names, Old Meanings 
 Language is important in defining what it means to be Rwandan, as is clear based 
on the unspoken RPF directive to stop using the words “Hutu,” “Tutsi,” or “Twa,” but the 
government is still referring to these groups using different names. There are five new 
terms that have been introduced as the only appropriate political terms for referring to 
members of these groups today: returnees, refugees, victims, survivors, and 
perpetrators.158 Returnees are the Tutsi who repatriated to Rwanda with the RPF after the 
genocide and had been exiled during the First and Second Republics. The refugees are 
divided into two groups, the “old caseload” and the “new caseload.”159 The old caseload 
refugees are Tutsis who came back to Rwanda once the RPF had established itself and the 
new caseload refugees are Hutus who repatriated or are still repatriating after fleeing in 
1994. Victims can be Hutus or Tutsis that suffered due to political violence in Rwanda, but 
the RPF does not count anyone as a victim of political violence after it assumed control of 
the country in 1994. The survivors are all Tutsis who lived through the genocide. Finally, 
the perpetrators are all Hutus who committed crimes during the genocide. Everyone in 
Rwanda knows which ethnicity the government is referring to when they use these terms.  
 The most controversial part of this five-part categorization is that the government 
offers selective benefits to people based on what category they fit into, and the Tutsi 
(survivors, victims, old caseload refugees, and returnees) receive much more support. 
Because the RPF does not allow anyone who suffered political instability within Rwanda 
after 1994 to be classified as victims, Hutus who had family members killed by the RPF as 
it consolidated control or because of Tutsi revenge killings are not entitled to government 
aid. The government disproportionately aids Tutsis, allocating about 5% of the national 
budget for survivors, neglecting many Hutus who were not guilty of any crimes with no 
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official support channels.160 Survivors far and away receive the most government support 
financially and politically. The Fund for the Neediest Survivors of Genocide in Rwanda 
(FARG) is viewed by many as a “Tutsi Fund,” and the government has done little to address 
the widespread belief that Tutsis are prioritized even when they are not the neediest in the 
entire population.  
The Hutu are either uncategorized members of the population who do not feel 
represented or are negatively typed as perpetrators. This creates issues because Rwandans 
feel that they are still living under the reality of the ethnic categorization of the past, but 
cannot address it. Shame and frustration are common sentiments among younger Hutus, 
especially, who want to break out of the undesirable mold the RPF has stuck them in. They 
resent the undertones of government language used to refer to Hutus as being tied to 
group guilt. They “want to distance themselves from the genocide as much as possible.”161 
Edouard explains it like this, “every Tutsi is a survivor because it was a genocide against 
them, but even though every Hutu was not a perpetrator they still feel like that is how they 
are seen.”  
 
Silence at Home 
For a nation rebuilding from a genocide, writing and disseminating a new national 
history may have seemed like a strange priority, but it was something the RPF quickly 
commissioned to educate “the youth who were less contaminated than their parents,” as 
one government official put it.162. It was deemed necessary to reverse the messages many 
parents were sending, messages of age-old fear and anger. Kagame and his government 
believed that putting the conflicts in Rwanda’s past to rest was absolutely critical for its 
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future. According to a Kigali-based secondary school teacher, the material is intended to 
emphasize the political nature of identity conflicts in Rwanda and undermine the less 
malleable attitudes about ethnicity.163 Politics can be overcome and forgiven, but ethnic 
antagonisms tend to last much longer. 
When asking Rwandan youth about how they first learned about the genocide, 
many of them credited history lessons in primary school or government speeches on the 
radio as their initial introductions to the facts. Further questions revealed that while this 
was their first direct presentation to it, all of them had pieced together their own history 
of the genocide using remarks they had overheard and tidbits of conversations with their 
families. It was something they inherently understood they were not supposed to talk 
about at home. A twenty-year old named Paul explained one typical experience of learning 
about the genocide saying,  
“The government would come to our school and talk about reconciliation, so it was 
probably in primary school that I first really learned. But I didn’t want to show my 
mom and dad that I understood what had happened so I tried not to ask about it.”  
 
Other young Rwandans reported an even later timeline of understanding the true realities 
of the genocide and its political context, reportedly finding out the details as late as age 
fifteen or sixteen. A young woman named Anna reported that until she was a teenager, she 
only understood the genocide as a “time of killing.” 
 There are a number of reasons that parents do not disclose much of their personal 
experiences with the genocide to their children, reasons related to fear, trauma, or even 
the belief that the stories are now irrelevant. Fear arises because parents worry about 
inadvertently causing their child to develop a dislike for Hutus or Tutsis if they talk too 
much about personal sentiments revolving around genocide. René, a twenty-two-year-old 
Rwandan, spoke of children in her primary school being expelled for saying the words 
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“Hutu” or “Tutsi” in class. When parents hear stories like this, it leads them to avoid 
conversations about ethnicity for fear that their family would suffer the consequences if 
the wrong person overheard their child say something potentially controversial. It is safer 
and easier to let the schools teach the official version of history than to risk being labeled 
as a parent who passes on “genocide ideology.”  
 Fear of saying the wrong thing and drawing the wrath or scorn of the government 
is heightened by the vague laws and incidents of intimidation or revenge against RPF 
opponents that have been discussed. While talking about identity and the genocide is not 
explicitly prohibited by law, the looseness with which the government has applied the 
terms “genocide revisionist” or “genocide denier,” and the negative repercussions that 
ensue, makes people feel that these topics are taboo. If a student is expelled from school 
for discussing ethnicity, a blanket of suspicion falls on the parents for indoctrinating their 
child with questionable ideals.  “It is serious, but subconscious, how much fear people are 
living with and reacting to on a daily basis,” a Rwandan educator explained when talking 
about why there is such reservation about addressing the issue of the genocide.164 
 Psychological trauma is another major factor that prevents parents from 
discussing the genocide with their children, regardless of if the parent was a survivor, 
perpetrator, or witness to the violence. The psychological toll on the population was only 
just beginning to rear its ugly head in the months following the end of the violence, it still 
is a pervasive social issue. One of the symptoms of parental trauma is the evasion of all 
mentions about experiences with the genocide when speaking to their children.165 This 
avoidance is even more pronounced in Rwanda because the government attempts to quiet 
distressing conversations about ethnicity. Many children in research studies have reported 
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picking up on persistent clues about their parents’ traumas, but not being able to discuss 
them, leading the children to make up their own theories about and develop fearful 
worldviews about an unspeakable past.166 In Rwanda, 43.2% of mothers who struggled 
with post-traumatic stress disorder from the genocide reported symptoms related to 
withdrawal from their children, making trauma an important psychological reason that 
conversations about the genocide do not happen at home.167  
A third common reason that discussions about the genocide are not common in 
Rwanda between parents and children is expressed by a fifty-one year old mother of six 
like this, “I do not want my children to know about the genocide, now we are reconciled 
and the pain has no reason to be brought into the next generation.”168 Some parents say 
that they do not believe there is an appropriate reason to talk about the genocide with their 
children because it’s over. But the reality is that the children experience its ramifications, 
regardless. This type of parenting approach, whether a true reflection of the parents’ 
sentiments or one they have adopted to avoid their own feelings, is not helpful because 
children still report having questions they do not feel comfortable asking their parents. 
Silence does not keep questions or the genocide’s reality at bay. 
While parents avoid talking about their own experiences, they do not keep their 
neighbors’ secrets as hidden. This is especially an issue in the Rwandan countryside where 
the communities are more intimately linked and everyone has heard about what their 
neighbors were doing during the genocide.169 It is not uncommon for Rwandan children 
to learn the details about their family’s role during the genocide from neighboring children 
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while playing on the street. That is how Edouard, the parliamentarian, learned that his 
father had been one of the Hutu killers and would soon be arrested by the RPF. A twenty-
two year old Rwandan reported that in primary school some Hutu children would stop 
coming to class because the Tutsi children derided them saying things like “your parents 
killed ours.”170 It is something that eventually comes out and controlling the shock by 
preparing children through conversations in the home would be beneficial.  
 
A Poisoned Reality 
As much as the government would like to control the introduction that children 
have to the genocide, they cannot monitor the messages transmitted within homes. Many 
children’s understanding of the genocide is derived from psychological processes as they 
grow up amongst genocide survivors, perpetrators, and witnesses. Today, the children are 
not immune to the psychological symptoms of trauma from the events that happened in 
1994, despite the fact that they do not have personal memories of the violence. Young 
Rwandans must navigate living in a post-genocide society that forces them to repeatedly 
confront the violence while simultaneously restricting their ability to explore it. The 
government acknowledges this problem saying,  
“Future generations will have only  a partial vision of the past, distorted by the 
emotional tales of their parents and friends, vulnerable to media propaganda, and 
susceptible to the kind of rumor and gossip that played such a devastating role 
before and during the killings of 1994.”171 
 
Intergenerational trauma transmission is an unfortunate and threatens to spread the 
deep-rooted suffering of the genocide and ethnic divisionism.  
In April of 1994 Patrick was a six-month old infant tightly swaddled against his 
mother’s back as she crouched in the bushes outside of a Catholic church in Kigali, 
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Rwanda. 172 His mother’s chest heaved against the ibitenge cloth that bound her young son 
to her back and she tried to focus on the warmth of his little body for strength. A week 
earlier, Patrick’s parents had fled with their twin sons for the safe haven of this church, 
believing that the murderous bands of genocidaires would never violate such a sacred 
space. Cramped in the nave of the church with seven-hundred other Tutsis, they waited, 
attempting to stave off hunger and thirst and ignore the growing stench. Then one 
morning grenades whistled through the windows and exploded between their jam-packed 
bodies, soon followed by a stampede of drunken Hutu genocidaires with guns and 
machetes. In the ensuing chaos Patrick’s mother fled, losing track of his twin and his 
father. So there she crouched outside the church, not knowing what would happen and 
mourning her husband and second son, while Patrick drifted off to sleep.   
The levels of trauma exposure in the Rwandan population due to the genocide are 
remarkably high, leading to a great risk for younger generations. From a representative 
sample of 2,047 Rwandans who were in the country in 1994, 24-26% meet criteria for post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).173 Today about 10% of the Rwandan population lives 
with untreated or undertreated PTSD, and, as a country with a high fertility rate, it is 
probable that most of them are raising children at risk of intergenerational trauma 
transmission. A key incentive for Rwanda to address post-traumatic stress disorder is that 
77% of people suffering from PTSD view reconciliation attempts by the RPF government 
unfavorably and refuse participate in nation-building initiatives.174 Even if direct trauma 
symptoms are not passed down, this negative attitude toward reunifying the country may 
be adopted by children and continue to threaten political upheaval. 
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While Patrick and the first generation at risk of inheriting trauma is still young and 
a comprehensive picture of the psychological consequences for them is not yet clear, there 
are indications that trauma transmission is occurring and influencing how Rwanda moves 
forward and how its people understand identity. Studies in Rwanda found that children 
from both groups experience deep anxiety about the recurrence of violence and a lack of 
trust in members of the opposite group.175 While it seems unthinkable when looking at the 
developed, clean streets of Kigali to imagine the country sliding back into genocide, the 
large majority of youths interviewed in Rwanda reportedly fear that there will be more 
violence in the future. Edouard, the parliamentarian in charge of Ndi Umunyarwanda, 
speaks from personal experience working with youths when he says “only now are shame, 
trauma, hatred, and distrust emerging in the next generation of Rwandan who are 
teenagers and twenty-year olds.” 
One of the complications that can result from parental trauma is over-
identification by children with a parent’s suffering. Parents who over-confide in their 
children or frame the world in the context of a horrific past typically cause significant 
distress and warp their children’s views of the world.176 These children experience trouble 
forming a separate sense of self. When a child’s understanding of their place in the world 
is so entangled with his or her parent’s trauma, it will be hard for them to disengage from 
the Hutu or Tutsi identity of their family members who lived through the genocide. In 
schools that serve children born after 1994, graffiti is still written with messages like “We’ll 
finish you all off next time” or “We will take revenge on the Hutus.”177 As Patrick grew up 
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he grew angry, talking with his young Tutsi friends on the streets saying “we would fight 
back this time, we would kill the Hutus, and we weren’t afraid because we were so angry.” 
Despite efforts of the Rwandan government to eradicate Hutu and Tutsi identities 
after the genocide, children and young adults today are having trouble letting go of 
intergroup antagonisms due to the experiences of their parents. The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5th edition criteria for post-traumatic stress 
disorder includes people who were indirectly traumatized after “learning that a close 
relative or close friend was exposed to trauma.” This means that many Rwandan children 
and young adults, like Patrick, could likely be diagnosed with PTSD and therefore be 
susceptible to negative attitudes toward reconciliation. Some children and young adults in 
Rwanda even report feeling like direct victims of the genocide.178  
In some instances, a traumatized Rwandan parent relies on his or her children for 
emotional support, especially when widowed, which distorts family roles and burdens 
children with age-inappropriate responsibility.179 In Rwanda, UNICEF and US 
government estimates put the number of child-headed households resulting from the 
genocide between 65,000 and 85,000.180 These statistics from Rwanda reveal an 
incredibly high number of children who do not receive adequate support from an adult 
figure and are at risk for psychopathology and maladaptation in their lives. Patrick became 
one of these children; he had to provide for all his mother’s emotional and material needs 
from age eleven. He learned to hide the calendars and turn off the radio so that his mother 
would not know when the month of April hit, the time when she had the worst nightmares 
and flashbacks. 
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 Ethnic animosity is most commonly transmitted to children indirectly as they 
observe negative behaviors or attitudes toward Hutus or Tutsis on the parts of their 
parents.181 Multiple youth in Rwanda report being instructed by their parents not to play 
with certain children without explanation, whispers about why a neighbor is in jail, 
hypotheses about why a child is an orphan, or what houses to avoid on the walk to school. 
It creates a “poisoned reality” in the opinion of one parent.182  Edouard talks about the 
challenges that accompany these vague directives and murmurs,  
“I think if children don’t get answers from their parents, that is an answer they 
understand. But the parents who are able to calmly talk to their children have much 
happier children, I can tell you that right now.” 
 
 Psychological implications of the genocide and maladjustment in Rwandan 
children is important for the RPF to address because it is one of the primary methods 
through which younger generations begin to understand the genocide. Government visits 
to schools and radio broadcasts they control are not the primary method through which 
children learn things about the genocide. The attitudes of Rwandan parents are not well-
hidden, but the message that children must not ask about the events seems clear. It can be 
very confusing to grow up with these ill-defined boundaries and evidently is not preventing 
ethnic animosity from being passed between generations, as the government would wish.  
 
Alice survived the genocide, but lost an arm and was left with a machete scar across 
her face. She told her story sitting in a circle of reconciled survivors and perpetrators who 
meet monthly to discuss the challenges they face. When Alice emerged from her hiding 
place at a neighbor’s house in July of 1994, she returned as a widow to the home she had 
lived in with her infant daughter before the violence. One year later, her former neighbor 
Emmanuel moved back to their village with the first wave of returning Hutu refugees. 
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Emmanuel is the man who amputated her arm and slashed her face and, in the 
reconciliation circle, he was sitting two chairs down from her as she retold her story. Alice 
and her young daughter, Sarah, intensely feared Emmanuel for years, but one day the 
government came and led a workshop where the two families were forced to speak with a 
mediator. It was a rocky few hours, but they slowly reestablished trust with one another. 
Now Alice has become like a godmother to Emmanuel’s small children and Sarah counts 
on Emmanuel to fill the missing role of her father when she needs it. It is one of the sincere 
success stories of reconciliation and shows the benefits of open communication about the 
genocide. 
Interestingly, it was a government sponsored initiative that brought the two of 
them together to talk out their differences and truly reconcile. Alice and Emmanuel’s story 
shows the true value of speaking individual truths, airing grievances, and finally putting 
conflicts truly to rest. If the government could expand this type of program and allow 
people to express themselves, as it did with Alice and Emmanuel, these types of 
reconciliations would be more plentiful and the country could experience real growth. 
Stories like Alice and Emmanuel’s are few and far between, but they show that true 
reconciliation is possible. Unfortunately, the government is afraid of expanding these 
initiatives too far into the population where they cannot be monitored or regulated as 
closely as they could in Alice and Emmanuel’s situation.  
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In Conclusion… 
 Rwanda’s cycle of victimhood is going to continue to turn if the Government of 
National Unity and Reconciliation, led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, continues to 
endorse policies that perpetuate ethnic division and prevent cohesive identity formation. 
The RPF is not making it clear that they are a party for all Rwandans and they are 
preserving frustrations in a Hutu population that feels underrepresented. This will 
continue threatening their proclaimed goal of perpetuating “Rwandaness.” To properly 
work toward this objective, the thinly-veiled language they use to differentiate between 
the ethnic groups must be applied more sparingly and only in appropriate, direct reference 
to people who were present during the genocide, so as not to be a continual reminder that 
people’s identities were frozen by their status during in 1994. The younger generations 
cannot be referred to as “the children of survivors or perpetrators of genocide” if they are 
expected to be Rwandans who will coexist and work together toward the prosperity of the 
nation.  
 Across Rwanda’s borders with the DRC, Uganda, and Burundi, there still exist 
many people who identify as ethnically Hutu and Tutsi and make it hard for Rwandans to 
forget the historical ramifications of these groups. The FDLR is one of a handful of Hutu 
extremist groups that operate in East Africa. As of May 2015, there is an ethnically charged 
battle happening in Burundi between a Hutu government and an increasingly 
disempowered Tutsi population.183 As hundreds of thousands of Burundians have fled to 
Rwanda in recent months as refugees, it is impossible to ignore that Hutu and Tutsi 
conflicts still exist and will continue to exist despite the efforts of the RPF. A sustainable 
solution needs to be developed that incorporates addressing and overcoming ethnic 
struggles in the population, not quashing them.  
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 The government’s national identity project distorts the reality of ethnic identity in 
Rwanda to serve political purposes and uses obedience and fear to pressure the population 
into adopting it. One of their key strategies has been to create as much of a barrier as 
possible between older generations infected with genocide ideology and younger 
generations who are less contaminated. They believe that if these barriers stay in place, a 
rigid history curriculum is maintained, and they can suppress all opposition, they will not 
only have a unified Rwanda, but a continuation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front itself. It is 
like the biological concept of survival of the fittest, Kagame and his loyalists will go to 
extreme lengths politically to ensure that the RPF’s legacy will be carried on after they are 
gone, even if they suffer negative repercussions in the present. 
 In an odd twist of reality, the RPF’s ultimate vision is indeed to end ethnic 
antagonisms, but they have deemed it necessary to strategically play off of them as they 
attempt to bring about this new reality in Rwanda. By posing as the victims of ethnic 
aggression, the RPF legitimizes itself as the unchallenged leaders of the nation and uses 
its victimhood as justification to assassinate opponents and intimidate critics. They create 
allegiance to their vision and their government through manipulating fear in the 
population. It is an interesting parallel with the manipulation of fear that the former Hutu 
governments used before the genocide to induce people to cooperate in a much different 
agenda. The Rwandan Patriotic Front and Paul Kagame make it clear that they want to 
unify Rwanda under one identity, but only tolerate those who unconditionally and 
deferentially accept all of their terms and conditions. 
 
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